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Abstract 
 
This thesis inquires into the application of Richard Shusterman’s somaesthetics 
with respect to contemporary art, through an analysis of the work of Yann Toma and 
Tatiana Trouvé included in the exhibition Aesthetic Transactions, 2012. In exploring 
somaesthetics in relation to art, this thesis addresses John Dewey’s aesthetics and idea of 
the consummatory experience, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology with 
respect to art and experience as parts of the foundation of Shusterman’s ideas of 
somaesthetics. In today’s decentralized, global art world, can somaesthetics offer a means 
of understanding and maintaining art’s vitality for viewers and/or artists?  In this thesis, I 
argue for somaesthetics’ potential utility in approaching contemporary art.  
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 1 
Introduction 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Robert Ryman, Untitled (1961). Oil on unstretched linen. 10 ¾ x 10 ¼” (27.3 x 26 cm). 
 
 
Paint. Thick, white, fingerlike strokes brush shoulders with each other, converge, 
gather, greet one another, cluster, halt suddenly, diverge, arc, twist, break. They assert 
themselves purposefully, determinedly over occasional pale tints of chartreuse and soft 
cerulean, scrubbed and dripped discreetly onto a thin, translucent layer of primer. Edges 
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of abrupt staccato marks converge; some define themselves alone: one, two, three 
stacked, parallel dashes stitch together patches of mint and baby blue, vaguely 
discernable amongst the swarm of warm, buzzing white marks petrified in their positions 
of over fifty years. Their thick, pasty consistency seems to be all that keeps them 
contained within the imperfect cut linen square that is their support. Edges fraying, its 
threads escape only to be engulfed in the mass of daubs mid-furl—thin, hairlike 
structures caught beneath thicker, rough valleys and now-crusted mountains of paint. 
Step back: the cut linen square is mounted floating in an abyss of white smoother and 
calmer than the one it contains, at eye level, less than a square foot in its entirety; 
illuminated, it seems to emit its own white light, glow. Paint. 
 
Robert Ryman’s Untitled, 1961, is one of the first of a lifetime of white 
paintings—some of them organic and gestural, some of them linear, all of them of white 
marks of Ryman’s own, united but all subtly unique variations. What critics and others 
have described as “unnerving,” “unsettling” and “maddeningly artless” “naked pictures,” 
are by Ryman himself described as “realist.”1 Suzanne Hudson attempts to hold to 
Ryman’s definition; from this perspective, she notes, his paintings “open onto and often 
explicitly annex the light, space, and walls of the galleries in which they are sited as part 
of the composition …a shadow cast by a deeply projecting stretcher is as much a part of 
the work as a painted field on the support that produces it.”2 Ryman’s paintings are not 
                                                
1 Suzanne P. Hudson, Robert Ryman: Used Paint (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2009), 3, 10. 
2 Ibid., 10.  
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illusions or windows into alternate or invented worlds, times, or spaces, but are intended 
as physical objects existing in our own world.  
As an artist emerging in the public eye in the later 1960’s who has largely eluded 
categorization (having been aligned with Minimalism, and later both Process and 
Conceptual Art), Hudson argues that “Ryman’s material experimentation manifests its 
own signs—not merely as process, but as embodied thinking.”3 Here, Ryman’s physical 
engagement with his materials (paint, support, canvas, etc…) as a physical form himself, 
a body in space, takes on great importance. As Hudson explains, drawing from Harold 
Rosenberg, this type of painting “turned on the artist’s encounter with the canvas as an 
arena for physical activity and psychological revelation. The artist as actor needed to be 
fully present for an encounter with his materials and active in a way that made the paint 
coextensive with the body unfurling it.”4 According to Ryman, this embodied thinking—
his distinct awareness of his own being as a physical body in his process of creating art, 
and the evidence of this left behind in the form of his white paintings—must not be 
judged by pre-established opinions or thoughts, but simply experienced in person; 
painting, for Ryman, “has continued as a series of propositions that are born out of an 
engagement with the materiality of paint, the properties of support structures, and notions 
of how such objects relate to their beholders in an exhibition space.”5 For Ryman, it is not 
about any type of imagery or representation within his paintings themselves, but his 
own—and our own, as viewers—experience with paint and these objects as just that: 
objects. His painting is both “derived from a series of encounters through which actions 
                                                
3 Ibid., 3. 
4 Ibid., 86. 
5 Ibid., 10, 18. 
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unfold out of and against a discrete set of options and concerns” and “the byproduct of an 
experiment and the evidence of its material instantiation—a process that continues to the 
present…”6 For Ryman, experience is defined by his encounters with the physical 
materials of painting: his body’s physical interaction with paint, brushes, canvas, support, 
all of these objects’ interactions with each other, and with their environment. It is this 
“experience” that is paramount for him as a creator, and for us as we encounter and 
interact with his objects and thus the evidence of his own actions, decisions, and 
thinking—as we, in turn, “experience” his work.  
 
For Susan Sontag, too, our experience of art objects is key. Writing in 1965, four 
years after Ryman’s creation of Untitled, 1961, amidst an art world having recently 
absorbed abstract expressionism—including action painting and color field painting—at 
the height of post-painterly abstraction, and seemingly infatuated with hermeneutics, 
Sontag also calls for our experience, rather than interpretation, of art objects in her essay 
“Against Interpretation.” In opposing and calling for a re-evaluation of interpretation—
our conditioned mode of approaching art, which has the potential to be liberating, but 
instead actually radically alters the art itself and can be “stifling”—Sontag advocates the 
pure, sensuous, immediate experience of all art, for “the merit of these works certainly 
lies elsewhere than in their ‘meanings.’”7 It is the images and form of art that first seduce 
and interest us in a work, and prompt us to understand or try to find its potential 
                                                
6 Ibid., 109. 
7 Susan Sontag, “Against Interpretation,” in Against Interpretation and Other Essays (New York: Farrar, 
Straus & Giroux, 1966), 7-8.  
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“meanings.”8 Interpretation, according to Sontag, “violates art” in its implication of 
“dissatisfaction” with the art object and desire to replace it with something else, such as 
narrative.9 It is for this reason avant-garde art is always “perpetually on the run,” 
sometimes even purposefully attempting to avoid interpretation through experimentation 
with form “at the expense of content.”10 
Sontag not only calls our attention to the complications and issues with 
interpretation, and our need to reconsider our employment of it, but also prompts us to 
think seriously about the way in which we approach art in general and what is at stake 
here. What are we to do? While Sontag reminds us that criticism is here to stay, she asks 
us to consider how it might better serve the work and avoid taking its place. How can 
paintings like those of Robert Ryman’s overcome their criticism—positive or negative—
and be something to us other than “naked pictures,” “maddeningly artless” and 
“unnerving,” spiritual and transcending, or even, as Ryman himself defines them, 
“realist”? How can we enable ourselves to “experience” art in itself, unobstructed by 
previous criticism?  
John Dewey, writing during the 1930’s and influential to the shaping of the ethos 
of experiential learning promoted at the Museum of Modern Art at the time Robert 
Ryman worked and received his exposure to and education of painting there in the 
1950’s, defines experience as the “result, the sign, and the reward of that interaction of 
organism and environment which, when it is carried to the full, is a transformation of 
                                                
8 Ibid., 9. 
9 Ibid., 10. 
10 Ibid., 11. 
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interaction into participation and communication.”11 Sontag claims that the most 
significant and liberating value in art is its “transparence”: “experiencing the 
luminousness of the thing in itself, of things being what they are.”12 How can we, as 
organisms, interact with our environments as Dewey suggests, “experience” an art object, 
and best ensure that we are able to see the transparence, the luminousness of an art object 
such as Untitled, 1961, itself? 
To further this, Sontag asserts that we have, as a culture and a society, lost the 
sharpness in our sensory experience, that our sensory faculties have been dulled by 
overproduction and excess, and that interpretation does not help with this—instead, it 
takes the sensory experience of the work for granted13 This is the heart of our issue:  
 
What is important now is to recover our senses…Our task is not to find the 
maximum amount of content in a work of art, much less to squeeze more 
content out of the work that is already there. Our task is to cut back 
content so we can see the thing [the art object] at all…The aim of all 
commentary on art now should be to make works of art—and, by analogy, 
our own experience—more, rather than less, real to us.14 
 
 
 According to Sontag, just as with Robert Ryman’s paintings, we need to allow 
ourselves to “experience” art; this summons in itself raises many important questions: 
how are we to accomplish this? And what is truly meant by “experience”? 
 
Sontag continues by analyzing the concept of style in relation to these questions. 
She is especially interested in the issue whereby “the main tradition of criticism in all 
                                                
11 John Dewey, Art As Experience (New York: Minton, Balch & Company, 1934), 22. 
12 Sontag, “Against Interpretation,” 13. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid., 14. 
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arts…in effect treats the work of art as a statement being made in the form of a work of 
art.”15 This is a case, she claims, of “art being put to use,” and she proposes a critical 
alternative perspective: “A work of art encountered as a work of art is an experience, not 
a statement or an answer to a question. Art is not only about something; it is something. 
A work of art is a thing in the world, not just a text or commentary on the world.”16 In 
this case proposed by Sontag, one example of an experience can be “a work of art 
encountered as a work of art.”17 What exactly does this imply, and how are we to do this? 
How is a work of art something—a “thing in the world”—rather than about something?18 
How can a work of art not be about something?  
While works of art do refer to the real world—our experience, values, and 
knowledge—they do not give rise to conceptual knowledge, Sontag argues.19 Instead, we 
gain a different kind of knowledge—not of something, but instead an experience of the 
style of knowing something, a way of knowing things in general. And in this, a work of 
art becomes dependent on the person having the experience; their compliance as the 
“experiencing subject” is necessary.20 So how can we, as viewers, become “experiencing 
subjects”? 
According to Sontag, part of the answer to this question lies in our ability to 
negotiate between aesthetic response and ethical response—the “pleasurable stimulation 
of consciousness” versus “responsible and humane conduct,” “achievement of human 
                                                
15 Ibid., 21. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid., 22. 
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will, dictating to itself a mode of acting and being in the world.”21 Although it may be 
true that our response to art can be considered “moral” in the way that it is “the 
enlivening of our sensibilities and consciousness,” it is the qualities of our aesthetic 
experience (such as “disinterestedness, contemplativeness, attentiveness, the awakening 
of the feelings”), including the qualities of the aesthetic object itself (“grace, intelligence, 
expressiveness, energy, sensuousness”) which emerge as essential in that they are also the 
qualities that make up a moral response to life: they can serve to instruct us to morally 
respond to life.22 It is the processing of experience itself that deserves our attention in the 
experience of art, Sontag claims—“transcending of the world in art is also a way of 
training or educating the will to be free in the world.”23 
For Sontag, the aesthetic experience defines itself as an experience of the forms or 
qualities of human consciousness, in which art objects can be seen as “living, 
autonomous models of consciousness,” and the world itself can be taken as an aesthetic 
phenomenon.24 In this world where consciousness is defined as wider than action, for it 
includes activities that have no need for justification, Sontag speaks of giving ourselves 
to the art object, detaching ourselves from the world—“adopting a different, more 
theoretical vantage point,” and allowing ourselves to be returned to it more open and 
enriched by art.25 What does she mean by this—how exactly might we surrender 
ourselves in this way, and allow ourselves to have these experiences, means of viewing 
ourselves, in a meaningful and effective way? How might this “transcending the world” 
                                                
21 Ibid., 23. 
22 Ibid., 25. 
23 Ibid., 26, 31. 
24 Ibid., 27-28. 
25 Ibid., 28-31. 
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be something that is available to all of us?  
“The most potent elements in a work of art are, often, its silences.”26 This, and 
many of Sontag’s ideas, seem to hold true for understanding and approaching the work of 
Robert Ryman in the way he intended: to just see it, to experience it, as organisms, 
bodies, interacting with our environments.  
In this thesis, I will develop an inquiry into the experience of art—the ways in 
which we experience art, and the nature of art and experience. These are not new issues, 
but have been addressed by others throughout history. Susan Sontag is relevant and raises 
this issue in a critical moment for art in the twentieth century, in 1965, almost fifty years 
ago; the thread she is part of in the discourse on art and experience can be traced back far 
earlier, through, among more, artists and philosophers. This thread has been in existence 
throughout history, woven in and out of discourse, dialogue, thought, writing, creation; 
sometimes it loops, weaves back in under, or becomes thinner, more threadbare and 
difficult to trace. It may have mutated, grown, switched directions, and redefined itself, 
but it has always been there, and is still here today. This thread can be traced especially 
through the ideas of John Dewey in Art as Experience, 1934, and later in the 1940’s, 
through Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology. Today, it has been picked up and 
carried most notably by philosopher Richard Shusterman, creator and advocate of 
somaesthetics. It emerges and re-emerges time and again not only because of its 
significance to each moment, style, artist, or writer, but because of its importance to all 
moments, and to us all as humans.  
What do we mean, the experience of art? Surely it has been important in 
                                                
26 Ibid., 36. 
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modernist painting, through minimalist painting and sculpture, and through many other 
movements in art…but how, and how now, into the present? Has art become so much of 
“everything goes,” no essential answer to no “essential question” or problem, that there 
are no longer any rules, any guidelines, any means for us to understand it? In such a 
multifaceted, decentralized contemporary art world, how do we, as viewers, understand 
art? And how do we, as artists, construct it? Are past methodologies to be discarded? Or 
is this our task—to seek meaning in a seemingly structureless world of contemporary art?  
Shusterman, through Dewey, Merleau-Ponty, and his own ideas of somaesthetics 
can help offer us ways to better understand not only contemporary art itself, but how it 
can be important in a society that continuously seems to demand art’s justification, for art 
to defend itself. Now, more than ever, it seems that Susan Sontag’s call for experiencing 
art—not interpreting it—is ripe for recalling and reenacting as a means of providing 
structure (or rather, revealing and reinforcing the potentials of this non-structure), and 
dealing with painting, an art frequently presumed dead, and contemporary art in general: 
can we live with it? No, not how we can live with something that is dead, but how it can 
continue to be alive in our interaction with it, and how important this interaction is: our 
experience of art, especially in the ways addressed by Shusterman and his ideas of 
somaesthetics, built through his own dealing with Dewey and Merleau-Ponty, emerges as 
not only valuable in its own right, but especially in that it can serve as a model on how to 
deal with and interpret all experience, and therefore ourselves.  
In the following parts, I will attempt to offer an analysis of experiencing painting, 
and later, contemporary art through Shusterman’s contemporary philosophy of 
 11 
somaesthetics with respect to his 2012 exhibition “Aesthetic Transactions” and its 
predecessors—the ideas and aesthetics of the philosophers necessary to the formation and 
understanding of somaesthetics, as referenced by Shusterman: Dewey and Merleau-
Ponty. Part One will offer an analysis of and inquiry into Dewey’s ideas of “aesthetic 
experience,” especially through his later work, Art as Experience (1934); Part Two, of 
Merleau-Ponty’s ideas of phenomenology and experience; and Part Three, of 
Shusterman’s contemporary philosophy of somaesthetics with respect to “Aesthetic 
Transactions.”  
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Part One: Dewey and the Aesthetics of Experience 
 
In working towards an understanding of Shusterman’s contemporary 
somaesthetics, it is essential to first work towards understanding the aesthetics of a 
philosopher of a different moment— the early twentieth century: John Dewey (1859-
1952). “America’s Philosopher,” although now recognized as one of the seminal thinkers 
of the twentieth century, was not initially, or for a considerable length of time, widely 
discussed in terms of his aesthetics.27 He has been more prominently noted as an 
educational thinker, reformer, pragmatist, and even social critic than for his work related 
to the arts; Dewey was a spokesperson for pragmatism and educational theory, a 
naturalist and instrumentalist, a philosophical psychologist, and an advocate of 
progressive, social democracy and the use of empirical scientific methodology to guide 
approaches to life.28 Although aesthetics were discussed in parts of his broad range of 
works throughout his career (including Psychology (1887), Democracy and Education 
(1915), Philosophy and Civilization (1931) and especially Experience and Nature 
(1925)), his only book dedicated to aesthetics, Art and Experience (1934), was published 
late in his career, the year he turned seventy-five.29 
Art and Experience was initially received with confusion.30 While Dewey 
believed that art and the aesthetic were “the ultimate response to the issues that motivated 
                                                
27 Larry A. Hickman, introduction to Reading Dewey: Interpretations for a Postmodern Generation, ed. 
Larry A. Hickman (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998), ix- xxi. 
28 Thomas M. Alexander, “The Art of Life: Dewey’s Aesthetics” in Reading Dewey:  
Interpretations for a Postmodern Generation, ed. Larry A. Hickman (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1998), 1. 
29 Phillip W. Jackson, John Dewey and the Lessons of Art (New Haven: Yale University  
Press, 1998), xi. 
30 Ibid., xi. 
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his philosophy,” and that “the aesthetic theory of a philosopher ‘is a test of the capacity 
of the system he puts forth to grasp the nature of experience itself,’” Art and Experience 
was criticized for being overly Hegelian and contrary to the pragmatism Dewey claimed 
to advocate, and so was taken by many as an incomprehensible tangent rather than an 
integrated culmination and critical to his entire philosophy.31 Dewey’s aesthetic 
philosophy promoting the arts, as opposed to the sciences, as the ideal of human 
achievement was not widely discussed in the face of a rise of analytic philosophy in the 
beginning of the second half of the twentieth century.32 However, by the early 1990’s, 
Richard Shusterman raised new discussion of Dewey as he converted from analytic 
philosophy to pragmatism, and later advocated pragmatist aesthetics through his book, 
Pragmatist Aesthetics (2000). 
 It was through this book that Shusterman championed Dewey. Although unsure 
of how much aesthetic experience should be analyzed in philosophical terms itself, 
Shusterman understood that he needed to look at Dewey at length, and that, as Dewey 
prescribes, “to esthetic experience…the philosopher must go to understand what 
experience is.”33 Having converted to pragmatism after being influenced by teaching his 
philosophy students who were dancers, for Shusterman, Dewey’s “upbeat aesthetic of 
natural energies” was appealing in that it “captures the aesthetically essential theme of 
the body which was lacking in analytic aesthetics but increasingly important and alluring 
in continental theory,” and rejected dualisms of all types, including the dichotomies of 
                                                
31 Alexander, “The Art of Life,” 1,5. 
32 Richard Shusterman, Pragmatist Aesthetics: Living Beauty, Rethinking Art, (Oxford, UK: B. Blackwell, 
1992), 11. 
33 Ibid., 10-11. 
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“body and mind, material and ideal, thought and feeling, form and substance, man and 
nature, self and world, subject and object, and means and end.”34 Opposed to the 
widespread analytic approach that Shusterman had been a scholar and teacher of, 
Dewey’s aesthetics advocated continuity, connecting art and life through “recovering the 
continuity of esthetic experience with normal processes of living.”35 Dewey’s aesthetic 
philosophy would be key not only to Shusterman’s newfound conversion to pragmatism, 
but also to the developments of his aesthetic philosophy of somaesthetics, as according to 
Shusterman, “it represents the best point of departure for new aesthetic thinking.”36 
Although some of Dewey’s views might be dated, Shusterman argues, pragmatist 
aesthetics points to “the most promising future we can envisage for aesthetic inquiry…To 
fulfill that future we will have to read and develop its Deweyan past.”37 
 
Dewey’s Aesthetic Philosophy 
Experience itself is at the heart of that Deweyan past, in Dewey’s aesthetics, and 
is central to its focus and goal. In Art as Experience, Dewey sets out to define the nature 
of art and aesthetic experience. This experience is that of “the live creature”— we, as 
humans, in our interaction and exchange with our lived environments as beings, guided 
by our desire to experience the world so that we can immediately enjoy meaning and 
value.38 Dewey attempts to connect art and life, and aims at “recovering the continuity of 
                                                
34 Ibid., 10, 14. 
35 Ibid., 13. 
36 Richard Shusterman, "Why Dewey Now?" Journal of Aesthetic Education 23.3 (1989): 66, accessed 
March 16, 2014, doi: 10.2307/3332763.  
37 Ibid. 
38 Alexander, “The Art of Life,” 3. 
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esthetic experience with normal processes of living.”39 For Dewey, these two—art and 
life—are not divided and separate entities, but are united in that they are both defined by 
experience. Art, according to Dewey, is not solely the art object viewed in a museum, but 
instead, “the actual work of art is what the product does with and in experience.”40 In this 
sense, it is also an event, and according to Dewey, “there is no work of art apart from the 
human experience.”41 Dewey argues that the special function and value of art, where we 
typically conceive of aesthetic experience, is not in meeting any specialized end, but in 
playing a role for the live creature by serving many ends, by integrating means and ends, 
and by “enhancing our immediate experience which invigorates and vitalizes us,”42 
allowing us to achieve whatever ends we each pursue.43 Through this, art “keeps alive the 
power to experience the common world in its fullness.”44 Deweyan aesthetics, 
Shusterman notes, is not interested in “truth for truth’s sake,” but in achieving 
richer and more satisfying experience, in experiencing that value without 
which art would have no meaning or point. For Dewey, experience rather 
than truth is the final standard. He sees the ultimate aim of all 
inquiry…not as mere truth or knowledge itself but as better experience or 
experienced value. The value of knowledge is in being instrumental to the 
enrichment of immediate experience through the control over action that it 
exercises.45 
 
The purpose of aesthetics, and Art and Experience, according to Dewey, is “to 
restore the continuity between refined and intensified forms of experience that are works 
                                                
39 Shusterman, Pragmatist Aesthetics, 13.  
40 Dewey, Art As Experience, 3. 
41 Thomas M. Alexander and John Dewey, John Dewey's Theory of Art, Experience, and  
Nature: The Horizons of Feeling (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 187. 
42 Shusterman, Pragmatist Aesthetics, 9. 
43 Alexander, “The Art of Life,” 5. 
44 Dewey, Art As Experience, 138. 
45 Shusterman, Pragmatist Aesthetics, 18. 
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of art and the everyday events, doings and sufferings that are universally recognized to 
constitute experience.”46 In order to achieve this, and to understand experience in general, 
we have to go to aesthetic experience, and, for Dewey, to the concept of having “an 
experience” or “consummatory experience.” 
 
Dewey and the “Consummatory Experience” 
“Experience,” according to Dewey, “is the result, the sign, and the reward of that 
interaction of organism and environment which, when it is carried to its full, is a 
transformation of interaction into participation and communication,” and involves some 
degree of “undergoing.”47 Experience occurs in time and space, where time is not an 
“endless, uniform flow” or a “succession of instantaneous points,” but instead can be 
viewed as an organization in change, or growth, organizing the relationship between 
uniform flow and instantaneous points.48 Space is the “comprehensive and enclosed 
scene” where one’s doings and undergoings take place.49 Within these parameters, 
experience forms patterns; the most crucial of these is that of the consummatory 
experience, or “an experience.” 
“An experience,” as opposed to experience in general, is a relationship of doing 
and undergoing that has structure, is fully-formed, a complete whole in that “the material 
experienced runs its course to fulfillment,” and “is integrated within and demarcated in 
                                                
46 Alexander, “The Art of Life,” 6. 
47 Dewey, Art As Experience, 22. 
48 Ibid., 23. 
49 Ibid. 
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the general stream of experience from other experience.”50 Although made up of a “flow 
of parts” that do not lose their self-identities,”51 “an experience” is unified by a single 
quality or “feel.”52 Where experience in general often is interrupted or not carried to any 
type of conclusion, an experience is unique (and rare) in that it is carried out to its 
consummation, and so is also referred to as “consummatory experience.”53 Within 
Dewey’s concept of the consummatory experience, the relationship between parts is 
perceived in a dynamic, growing continuity of interaction.54 
For Dewey, consummatory experience can be positive or negative, anything from 
running a race, to eating a meal or having a conversation; each is an interaction between 
human and environment, a relationship of doing and undergoing, acting and being acted 
upon, that forms a consummate whole, and in which all independent parts are united by 
an overarching quality that defines the experience altogether.55 Although it may not be 
possible to identify this unifying “quality” until after later reflection on a completed 
experience, Dewey argues that it is pervasive throughout the experience, and works to 
distinguish a consummatory experience from ordinary experience.56 The form of a 
consummatory experience, however, is perhaps most significant to this idea of its unity 
and aesthetic quality: according to Dewey, “no experience of whatever sort is a unity 
unless it has esthetic quality.”57 An experience’s form is due to its consisting of “doing 
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and undergoing in a relationship”58—a “perceived relationship between the phases of 
experience which are had or undergone and those which are done.”59 
For Dewey, the ultimate example of consummatory experience is art; it is here 
where the attitude of the artist is most akin to that of the live creature itself, and in which 
the “whole creature is alive.”60 Through Dewey, art becomes instructive as a model of 
what an experience means—through the experience of art, we can learn about what it 
means to have an experience in general.61 Through the actions and undergoings of the 
artist— in true connection with the “live creature”—and his or her perception of the 
relationship of these actions and undergoings, we are presented with the epitome of 
consummatory experience, an idea whose influence would reverberate, if covertly, 
through American art in the decades to come. 
 
Influence of Dewey 
Eighteen years following Art as Experience, Harold Rosenberg wrote for Art 
News in New York on the topic of “The American Action Painters”: a new category of 
American painting given this name by Rosenberg and separated from earlier 
“abstractionists” by a differing consciousness of painting’s function. He observed, “at a 
certain moment the canvas began to appear to one American painter after another as an 
arena in which to act—rather than as a space in which to reproduce, re-design, analyze, or 
‘express’ an object, actual or imagined. What was to go on the canvas was not a picture 
                                                
58 Ibid, 45-46. 
59 Alexander, “The Art of Life,” 16. 
60 Dewey, Art As Experience, 27, 32. 
61 Jackson, John Dewey and the Experience of Art, 33. 
 19 
but an event…an encounter…” the motive of which was for “extinguishing the object.”62 
Rosenberg, in commenting on this new emerging painting, as if these artists had been 
“directed by a single voice”, argues that, here, all aspects of painting except for the act 
itself were subordinated; what mattered was “always the revelation contained in the act: 
in the final image will be a tension.”63 Rosenberg’s writing on this emerging informal 
abstract painting, what he terms the “act-painting,” echoes Dewey’s ideas of aesthetic 
experience.64 His identification of the American Action Painters rings true with Dewey’s 
ideas and goals, and indeed, according to Rosenberg, “the new painting has broken down 
every distinction between art and life;” what Dewey had advocated and called for in Art 
as Experience, it seems, had been achieved.65 Rosenberg notes, in accordance with 
Dewey, that now, art’s value must be found apart from art, and that the art, “the act,” 
transcends the world.66 Just as in seeking an understanding of Dewey’s aesthetic 
experience, “the spectator [of American Action Painting] has to think in a vocabulary of 
action: its inception, duration, direction—psychic state, concentration and relaxation of 
the will, passivity, alert waiting. He must become a connoisseur of the gradations 
between the automatic, the spontaneous, the evoked.”67 He is, in short, prompted to think 
about aesthetic experience as Dewey defines it, about the relationship between all doing 
and undergoing the artist must negotiate and perceive. In analyzing this new painting’s 
place in the art world, the center of which Rosenberg places in New York, he, like 
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Dewey, acknowledges the educational value of art: “Modern art is educational, not with 
regard to art, but with regard to life.”68 In many ways, Rosenberg’s “American Action 
Painters” seem to be the physical manifestation, realization, and models of Dewey’s 
aesthetic experience.69 
However, Rosenberg is more focused on the psychological and personal aspect of 
this new painting for the artists, “The American Action Painters” themselves. For him, 
their taking to “the white expanse of canvas as Melville’s Ishmael took to the sea” is a 
more personal dramatic struggle, “an adventure over depths in which he might find 
reflected the true image of his identity,” and “the creation of private myths” for the artist 
rather than purely about this experience of painting in itself (the philosophy of just “TO 
PAINT”).70 The experience of painting for Rosenberg, although key to the definition of 
the new American Action Painters, seems to exist as a means, and serve a purpose 
outside of itself, to transcend itself— to provoke the artist into a “dramatic dialogue.”71 In 
calling for a genuine criticism, audience and understanding of this “new painting,” 
although possibly directed at his opponent in the criticism of Abstract Expressionism, 
Clement Greenberg, perhaps he needed to look not in the present, but backwards to 
Dewey.72 
In “The American Action Painters,” Rosenberg is more focused on the 
psychological drama and personal aspect of this new painting on the artist, of the “event” 
that is Action Painting, and more concerned with the artist’s identity than solely the 
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experience itself, the result of this new “act-painting” being a means for the artist to 
engage in a dramatic personal struggle and creation of personal myths. According to 
David Kenneth Holt, Harold Rosenberg’s relationship with Dewey’s ideas in general is 
somewhat problematic—Rosenberg does not accept a physical and transcendental art, 
just a transcendental one, for example.73 This seems to distinguish itself from Clement 
Greenberg’s adherence to formalism and the emphasis of the art object itself.74 However, 
regardless of Rosenberg’s interpretation of this new painting, or of the question of 
Dewey’s direct influence on the artists in this movement, Rosenberg’s description of 
these new types of painters and what they were doing undoubtedly resonates with 
Dewey’s ideas of aesthetic experience.  
Dewey’s own views on Abstract Expressionism have remained controversial. 
Although he has been recognized for his promotion of a variety of types of art, from 
painting and sculpture to folk arts, and does not criticize abstraction, Dewey mostly 
includes representational art from the Impressionist and Post-Impressionist period as 
examples in Art as Experience, and has been criticized for being conservative in not 
dealing more with the avant-garde art of his moment, despite the influence of his old 
student and colleague Barnes, a collector to whom he dedicated Art as Experience, and 
who introduced him to much modern art, and served as a key source for discussion on art 
and aesthetics.75 It is argued (especially by Maurice Berube in “John Dewey and the 
                                                
73 David K. Holt, The Search for Aesthetic Meaning in the Visual Arts: The Need for the  
Aesthetic Tradition in Contemporary Art Theory and Education (Westport, Conn: Bergin & Garvey, 2001), 
110. 
74 Charles Harrison and Paul Wood, ed., Art in Theory, 1900-2000: An Anthology of Changing Ideas 
(Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub, 2003), 589. 
75 Maurice R. Berube, “John Dewey and the Abstract Expressionists,” Educational Theory 48 (1998):213-
224. doi: 10.1111/j.1741-5446.1998.00211.x. 
 22 
Abstract Expressionists” (1998)) that Dewey’s aesthetics, through Art as Experience, 
although perhaps largely ignored in general during the twentieth century, did in fact 
influence many American artists following its publication,76 notably Regionalist painter 
Thomas Hart Benton, abstract painter Robert Motherwell, Minimalist sculptor Donald 
Judd, and arguably Happening and Performance artist Allan Kaprow, among others, and 
had a strong influence on Abstract Expressionism and Abstract Expressionist painters.77 
Jackson Pollock, as the “star student” and mentee of Benton, is no exception. 
 
Dewey’s Aesthetic Experience and Jackson Pollock 
A definition of a significant art is, then, thrown back on a definition of that 
kind of experience which can generate it…A living art, or living arts 
rather, are generated by the direct life experiences of their makers within 
milieus and locales…Experience...as it bears on the question of a vital art, 
is closely tied to locales. As experience of this nature is heavily 
conditioned environmentally and psychologically it has a direct social 
relationship to the community.78 
 
Stuart Buettner’s quote of Thomas Hart Benton in “John Dewey and the Visual 
Arts in America” reveals the extent of the influence of Dewey’s aesthetics on Benton—
an influence that he acknowledged, and in which the concept of art was a “living” one, 
inextricable from and defined by experience.79 These ideas would become the milieu the 
young Jackson Pollock experienced as a student and friend of Benton’s during the 1930’s 
at the Art Students League in New York.  
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Although Pollock would later claim his work with Benton as important “as 
something against which to react very strongly,” and despite the opposition of their 
painting (Regionalism versus Abstract Expressionism), the influence of Benton’s 
teaching on Pollock is undeniable.80 This is evident especially through Pollock’s 
modification of Benton’s values and emphases in painting, and the similarities that can be 
observed in their attitudes on the experience of art. Benton’s precepts can be recognized 
in Pollock’s modification of “not only Benton’s accentuated linearity and centrifugal 
construction, but also his teacher’s focus on light and dark as the primary basis of 
pictorial organization, his stratification of forms to create a feeling of deep space, and his 
accent on rhythm.”81 The influence of Benton on Pollock in terms of his attitudes and 
ideas, and his concept of art, can also be argued, as is by Buettner: “there can be little 
doubt that many of the artistic attitudes which had meaning for Benton were obviously 
assimilated by Pollock,” despite the difficulty of tracing any direct influence of Dewey on 
Pollock.82 Regardless of the extent of Dewey’s direct influence on Pollock, Pollock 
exemplifies Dewey’s aesthetics and idea of the consummatory experience through his 
process-based drip painting such as Lavender Mist: Number 1, 1950, the very type of 
“action painting” Rosenberg hails.
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Figure 2: Jackson Pollock, Lavender Mist: Number 1, 1950 (1950). Oil, enamel, and aluminum on canvas. 
87 x 118”. 
 
Lavender Mist: Number 1, 1950: oil and enamel paint on canvas, 41 x 118 inches, 
close to ten feet full of Pollock’s drips, drags, lines, scattered drops of lavender, soft 
violets and mauves, creams, warm and cool grays and black paint that would come to 
define the fully developed style of “drip painting” he became known for. By this time, he 
had substituted the traditional use of brushes for their use “more as sticks rather than 
brushes—the brush doesn’t touch the surface of the canvas,” with a “flowing kind of 
paint,” and stretched canvas on an easel or the wall for unstretched canvas on the floor.83 
Although Pollock was not the first artist to create a composition by “spilling paint” on his 
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canvas, as many writers have noted, it is truly through his action, the act of his painting in 
its totality, that he exemplifies “an experience.”84 Although the painting itself adheres to 
Dewey’s aesthetic experience in its energy, tension, relationship and unification of all 
drops and drips of paint forming a unified, structured whole, it is truly the “event” or 
process—the action—of painting itself by which the live creature creates which models 
Dewey’s consummatory aesthetic experience. 
 Through Pollock’s act of painting Lavender Mist, we can begin to understand 
Dewey’s idea of the live creature actively engaged in interacting with his lived 
environment. In the structuring of his studio environment, his materials and surface, and 
the way that he interacts with these alone, we can begin to understand Pollock as “the live 
creature”: with his canvas on the floor, Pollock explains that he feels “a part of the 
painting, since this way I can walk around it, work from four sides and literally be in the 
painting…”85 No longer fighting with his materials, with the medium of paint, Pollock 
“seems to become one with it.”86 As has been noted from Hans Namuth’s famous 
photographs of the artist working, Pollock is “engaged in an intense dialogue with his 
materials,” in an extremely physical way, despite the fact that he never made physical 
contact with the forms he was creating as the brush was no longer touching the canvas.87 
The scale of Lavender Mist and many of his later paintings required a manner of painting 
that was extraordinarily physical, in which the “interaction” between environment 
(Pollock’s surface, the unstretched canvas on the floor, and his materials, his brushes 
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used as sticks and the liquid paint itself) and “live creature” (Pollock himself) was taking 
place on a larger, more dramatic scale and in a more intensified way than had happened 
with painting in the past. No longer was this “interaction” taking place solely in the hand, 
the brush, and the canvas, but in Pollock’s entire studio, throughout the room, in 
“dancelike” and “muscular” movement that engaged every part of his body.88 Lavender 
Mist, following Pollock’s innovation in Number 1A, typifies his works “where it is clear 
that, in order to create it, he had involved virtually every bone and muscle in his body.”89 
This is the live creature completely engaged with his environment; here Pollock is 
interacting to his fullest capacity.  
 
Interacting here is key: it is not only Pollock’s action, his “doing,” in his active 
splattering, dripping, pouring in circling his canvas physically as if in dance in creating 
Lavender Mist, but his “undergoing,” his perception and appreciation of this doing, that 
forms this interaction. For Dewey, the painter has to “undergo” consciously the effect of 
every brushstroke, and has to see the connection with what he is doing “and where his 
work is going.”90 His conception of the experience of art—and thus, “an” experience in 
general— involves not only the act of production itself, what Dewey refers to as the 
“artistic,” but also, and inseparably, the “aesthetic”: the perception, appreciation, and 
enjoyment of that production.91 
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 Although accounts of Pollock’s painting in his own words are limited, as he was 
wary of being betrayed by words, he explained in Possibilities, 1948, that “When I am in 
my painting…I have no fears about making changes…it is only when I lose contact with 
the painting that the result is a mess. Otherwise there is pure harmony, an easy give and 
take, and the painting comes out well.”92 It is through this that we are able to better 
understand Pollock’s making of Lavender Mist as a result of Pollock’s remaining in 
constant “contact” with the painting, not only in a physical “artistic” way, but mentally, 
in his perception and appreciation of that physical movement, that action of creating. 
Indeed, Robert Motherwell characterized Pollock as using paint as “his thought’s 
medium;” his destiny a “confrontation with the process of painting itself.”93 
 Lavender Mist, as one example of Pollock’s confrontation with the process of 
painting, is united by its overall coverage of paint (Pollock’s “allover approach”), and its 
balance between dark and light, thin and thick violet, gray and pale paint— there is 
tension, but negotiated and balanced. It is aesthetic, down to the Deweyan sense of the 
word: while the biggest complaint and criticism about Pollock’s drip painting was that it 
was “unorganized chaos,” drip paintings such as Lavender Mist were not “accidents” at 
all in any sense, but the result of Pollock’s own perception and appreciation in addition to 
action.94 
Pollock does not fail Dewey’s conception of artists as individuals gifted with 
sensitivity, and heightened perception: Pollock’s comprehension of the world of man and 
his surroundings was noted to be “all-inclusive” by his friends and associates, his “deeply 
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felt sympathy with the rhythms of the universe” “inherently shamanistic” and “unusually 
intuitive.”95 He had an “extreme awareness” for the physical aspect of his painting, and it 
was not random—in the development of his drip painting, Harold Rosenberg notes that 
Pollock had succeeded in finding a means of projecting “the expression of a pure state,” 
and, according to Landau commenting on Namuth’s photographs of Pollock working, in 
becoming “one” with his work.96 Pollock’s own summation of his work reads:  
Technic is the result of need— 
new needs demand new technics— 
total control—denial of 
the accident— 
States of order— 
organic intensity— 
energy and motion— 
memories arrested in space, 
human needs and motives— 
acceptance—97 
 
Pollock’s “total control,” “denial of…the accident,” and “States of order” are here 
at odds with the claims of unorganized chaos that so infuriated him. What others 
perceived as such disorder and inexplicable pandemonium of paint, Pollock saw as a 
mental and physical process through which he desired to “create a holistic experience for 
both himself and the spectator.”98 Although he recognized the role of chance in his work, 
he recognized equally his own role in attempting to deny the accident and maintain 
control. When asked if he used the accident or controlled it, Pollock replied with, “‘What 
makes you think it’s an accident when I know what I’m going to drip before I work?’” 
and later elaborated, “‘When I am painting I have a general notion as to what I am 
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about…I can control the flow of paint; there is no accident…’”99 Pollock’s highly 
physical and active process can thus be seen also as one balanced with perception and 
reflection, and Pollock’s own understanding of this balance, uniting Dewey’s concept of 
the artistic “doing” and the aesthetic “perception and appreciation” that “make an 
experience an experience.”100  
In Lavender Mist, 1950, this is visible through Pollock’s “allover approach”—his 
equal treatment of the canvas as a whole—and the balance, rhythm and movement of line 
and forms learned through his time with Benton: aspects that could not be achieved by a 
“mindless” process, of which he was often accused. No one color or type of drip 
overpowers the rest, but rather all are negotiated in a holistic structure: an underlying web 
of long, black linear drips supports a smattering of pale colored spatters, thin, white 
spidery linear drips, “myriad tiny outbursts of colored energy,” and a balanced 
directionality, weight, form, and amount of paint throughout. Pollock’s risking unwanted 
marks and drips, and working in a mental and physical interaction with his painting to 
bring his paintings to their conclusion, embodies the very relationship of undergoing and 
doing that defines Dewey’s consummatory experience, where, according to Dewey, 
“what is done and what is undergone are thus reciprocally, cumulatively, and 
continuously instrumental to each other.”101  
In this type of painting, this type of experience, each independent part of 
Pollock’s experience of painting—each movement and gesture that leads to a new mark, 
each color used, each brush used, each session of work, and each way it can be broken 
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down into parts—retains its identity. As viewers, we can visually identify individual 
marks and colors in Lavender Mist—long, thin linear drip, light gray drop, 
etc…individual parts of Pollock’s process and experience; each of these self-identified 
parts, is simultaneously integrated into what we can also visually identify as a complete 
whole of the finished piece and Pollock’s completed experience. In this sense, Lavender 
Mist, and Pollock’s drip paintings in general, adhere to Dewey’s qualification for 
consummate experience as being a whole comprised of independent parts. Lavender Mist 
is united by form, which for Dewey, in art, can be seen as  “the operation of forces that 
carry the experience of an event, object, scene, and situation to its own integral 
fulfillment.”102 
Although the experience of painting was key to Pollock, the purpose of his 
painting, he believed, was to make a statement. This statement, whatever it may be, can 
be thought of as the overarching “quality” or “feel” that unites “an experience” for 
Dewey. For Pollock, his statement was often about painting itself, arrived at through the 
expression of emotion.  As viewers, we might come to identify an overarching quality as 
a pervasive mood or emotion evoked through aspects of the painting such as color or 
movement. This all-encompassing quality might be identified differently based on the 
identifier, but in Pollock’s paintings it exists, if even only because he sought to make it 
exist, through making a statement and expressing his emotion. “Experience of our age in 
terms of painting—not an illustration of—(but the equivalent)” is what he wrote of what 
he intended to express in his work.103 Through Pollock’s relationship of “doing” and 
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“undergoing” through the way in which he paints, and his perception of this relationship, 
he exemplifies Dewey’s consummatory experience.  
 Through Pollock’s action painting such as Lavender Mist, we can come to better 
understand not only Polock’s experience of painting, but of what it means to have “an 
experience” according to Dewey, a consummatory experience. In Art as Experience, 
Dewey attempts to show how the “conception of conscious experience as a perceived 
relation between doing and undergoing enables us to understand the connection that art as 
production and perception and appreciation as enjoyment sustain to each other.”104 
Through his unique style of drip painting, Pollock shows us how art as production, 
perception, and appreciation as enjoyment enables us to understand the conception of 
conscious experience—“an experience” in particular—as a perceived relation between 
doing and undergoing. Through Pollock, the act of painting exemplifies the consummate 
experience, and thus can serve to instruct us about experience in general. 
 
Mark Rothko and Dewey’s Consummatory Experience 
 While studying Jackson Pollock’s action painting can give us an understanding of 
the way the act of painting or creating in general in art can exemplify Dewey’s idea of 
consummatory experience, looking briefly to Pollock’s contemporary, Mark Rothko, and 
his painting Number 61 (Brown, Blue, Brown on Blue), 1953, can provide an 
understanding of the role of the aesthetic aspect of “an experience” as opposed to the 
“artistic,” not through the creation of art, but in viewing it. Rothko is not an action painter 
as Pollock can be thought of, but instead paints large surfaces that prompt 
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contemplation.105 Rather than concerning himself with the means of painting, Rothko is 
more interested in the result, although he does not oppose Dewey’s definition of art as 
being not solely the object—he is interested in the experience of the viewer and the 
transcendental. For Rothko, as he writes in “The Romantics Were Prompted” in 1947,  
 
Pictures must be miraculous: the instant one is completed, the intimacy between 
the creation and the creator is ended. He is an outsider. The picture must be for 
him, as for anyone experiencing it later, a revelation, an unexpected and 
unprecedented resolution of an eternally familiar need.106 
 
  
Whereas Pollock is interested in the act of painting, Rothko seems to be more 
interested in the result— what happens after its completion. In this way, he offers us 
another perspective on Dewey’s consummatory aesthetic experience and means through 
which it is exemplified through art. Through Rothko’s large scale paintings, the critical 
“aesthetic” aspect of Dewey’s consummatory experience is modeled not through the act 
of painting itself, but in viewing; through this we are able to better understand Dewey’s 
idea of the aesthetic in consummatory experience—the perception.  
Number 61 (Brown, Blue, Brown on Blue), 1953, although painted only a few 
years after Lavender Mist, 1950, is far removed from Pollock’s action-filled expanse of 
drips and spatters. Instead, Rothko’s larger-than-human scale (almost ten foot tall) 
composition of unoutlined slightly translucent brown, white, and blue rectangles buzz 
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against a cerulean background, “presented in relentless frontality.”107 Although not a flat, 
two-dimensional image, the “space sensations” implied in Number 61 (Brown, Blue, 
Brown on Blue), 1953 lie outside of the picture plane, “on some meeting 
ground between the picture and the viewer.”108 It is this space and interaction with which 
Rothko was primarily concerned, and which is of particular importance to an 
understanding of Dewey’s consummate experience.  
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Figure 3: Mark Rothko, Number 61 (Brown, Blue, Brown on Blue) (1953). Oil on canvas. 116½ x 92”.  
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Here, as the viewer in an interaction of this type with Number 61 (Brown, Blue, 
Brown on Blue), we are confronted with a painting in our own human scale, almost as 
another being with whom to interact. It is precisely this interaction that Rothko desires, 
and which is so important to Dewey’s consummatory experience. Although perhaps an 
entire consummatory experience has been carried to its fulfillment in Rothko’s creation 
of this painting, on a larger scale another one is still in progress: that of the painting as an 
entirety. Here, the viewer comes into play through her own perception of the vast expanse 
of blue forms she is confronted with. “Perception,” for Dewey, goes beyond recognition 
for the reception of a work, where receptivity is a process of a series of responsive acts 
that accumulate toward objective fulfillment, but rather takes “continuous interaction 
between the total organism and the objects”— in this case, the viewer and the ten feet of 
Number 61(Brown, Blue, Brown on Blue).109 In order to achieve the “undergoing” phase 
of a consummatory experience, according to Dewey, we must summon energy and use it 
towards a response; as “undergoing” is not passive, but involves surrender, we must be 
willing to take things in, but also to create: “to perceive, a beholder must create his own 
experience.”110 
It seems to be this which Rothko himself calls us to do in interacting with his 
paintings— for him, as he recorded in his personal collection of writings, The Artist’s 
Reality, published posthumously, space is “the most inclusive category of the artist’s 
statement and can very well be the key to meaning in the picture.”111 For Rothko, the 
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experience of viewing his works was of the utmost importance, and he was often 
particular and thought by some to be somewhat controlling about aspects of exhibiting 
his work, such as lighting, hoping to create a type of sanctuary for the viewer.112 In 
experiencing Rothko’s work as he desired, and as Dewey advocates, in allowing 
ourselves to interact with the painting and opening ourselves to taking things in, but also 
summoning energy to allow ourselves to create our own experience, which Rothko sets 
us up for through his emphasis on the space surrounding his work for our interaction, we 
are able to engage directly in the aspect of perception necessary to “an experience” as 
claimed by Dewey. 
 It is this perception—the perception of the relationship between doing and 
undergoing—through which the consummatory experience can come to completion. In 
viewing Number 61 (Brown, Blue, Brown on Blue), we are able to view Rothko’s 
creation, the relationship between his own doing and undergoing, objectified, and thus, 
with our perception of this, work to create and complete a type of overarching, larger 
consummatory experience of the work itself. It is through this relationship— that of the 
artist and the viewer with respect to the painting, the entire system of the painting as a 
whole, from the artist’s own potential consummatory experience in creating it through 
her own perceived relationship of doing and undergoing, and of artistic and aesthetic 
components, to the viewer’s perception of the artist’s relationship of doing and 
undergoing—that a larger, total consummatory experience surrounding the painting is 
realized.  
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The Phenomenological Sense of John Dewey 
 
Through an understanding of Dewey’s aesthetics, and especially of his concept of 
the aesthetic experience, we are able to better understand the nature of art and experience 
in general, and especially the concepts that informed, motivated, and influenced Richard 
Shusterman in his development of somaesthetics, through which new ways of 
approaching art—especially contemporary art—can be opened up and utilized. Whether 
directly or indirectly, Dewey’s influence on various American artists of the twentieth 
century, and later, philosopher Richard Shusterman, was real.  
 One notable concept of Dewey’s influence is the reciprocity of “experiencing-
experienced” that Victor Kestenbaum argues is “implicit in Dewey’s notions of 
interaction and transaction,” and is “a well-developed conception of intentionality.”113 In 
addition to this intentionality, Kestenbaum argues for the importance of a principle of 
Dewey’s philosophy of experience that both admirers and critics had seemingly ignored: 
Dewey’s emphasis on immediately lived meanings as opposed to knowledge as a means 
of understanding reality, which are based in his concept of habit.114 To better appreciate 
Dewey’s powerful philosophy of experience, Kestenbaum works to illuminate this notion 
of habit from a phenomenological point of view, something that he looks to Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty to accomplish for his establishment of pre-objective intentionality of 
habitual meaning.115 Through Kestenbaum’s work, we can understand Dewey’s Art as 
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Experience, as more than a study in aesthetics, and “the pre-objectivity intentionality of 
habit” as “the most basic context of Dewey’s book.”116 
Kestenbaum here models Dewey’s own value of reflection as “the most reliable 
method for securing meaning” in looking not only at the effects of the past on the present 
(or at least the less distant past), but how the present can also open up new meanings in 
the past, in looking back.117 In moving forward to explore the ideas and influence of 
Merleau-Ponty himself in working towards an understanding of Shusterman’s 
somaesthetics, I hope that this spirit of reflection can be continued, and that new insights 
can be gained not only in building off of a better understanding of Dewey, but perhaps 
also in looking back at these ideas through other understandings and ideas. 
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Part Two: Phenomenology and Aesthetics 
 
In taking the next steps towards an understanding of Shusterman’s somaesthetics, 
it would be helpful now to work towards understanding a philosophy and aesthetics that, 
like Dewey’s, but in a different way, deals with experience; we need to deal with 
phenomenology. Phenomenology, broadly defined, is “the study of structures of 
consciousness as experienced from the first-person point of view, in which intentionality 
is the central structure of an experience,” in that the experience is being directed toward 
something.118 It is the study of “phenomena,” the appearance of things, or things as they 
appear to us in our experience: “the ways we experience things” and “the meanings 
things have in our own experience,” including the significance of objects, events, tools, 
the flow of time, the self, and others as these things arise and are experienced in our “life-
world.”119 This part of the thread tracing the issue of experience, including that of art, 
overlaps with Dewey’s ideas of art and experience and aesthetics. Edmund Husserl 
(1859-1938), the founder of phenomenology, was writing on and concerning himself with 
these types of issues, “phenomenological-descriptive analysis of specific types of 
experiences and their correlates (experiences of thinking and knowing and their products) 
as well as with describing general structures of consciousness” and the “foundation and 
elaboration of the corresponding methodology (phenomenological reflection, 
reduction…)” as early as 1900 in his Logical Investigations, twenty-six years before 
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Dewey would publish Art as Experience .120 Although Logical Investigations and 
Husserl’s early thinking about these issues of experience, as that of a mathematician 
branching out towards psychology and philosophy, begins more from science rather than 
art, the thinking that began with this text formed the foundation of the phenomenology 
that Husserl’s student, Heidegger, and later phenomenologists and philosophers such as 
Merleau-Ponty, would build upon, connect more thoroughly, and create variations on in a 
way that is important to aesthetics.121 
Departing from his early investigations in Logical Investigations, 1900-1901, 
Husserl began to develop his concept of “transcendental phenomenology,” which would 
mature in his later works, in search of a “pure consciousness” and the units of 
consciousness he defines as “intentional acts” or “intentional experiences,” those “having 
intentional content,” which would come to define “intentionality” as a critical component 
of phenomenology.122 He also begins the type of thinking that would lead to his 
development of “epoché” or “bracketing,” a method which called for phenomenological 
description (first-person perspective description exactly as something is experienced or 
intended by the subject) that “must not rely upon the correctness of any existence 
assumption concerning the object(s)…the respective act is about”; instead, “the epoché 
has us focus on those aspects of our intentional acts and their contents that do not depend 
on the existence of a represented object out there in the extra-mental world.”123 This, 
according to Husserl, leaves us with a “pure” conception, approach, understanding and 
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experience of the world. Although Husserl had a background in mathematics and physics, 
his interest was in what was left when the scientific conceptions of the world were 
removed, this “pure” conception of the world. Phenomenology itself Husserl presents as a 
“new, critical, and rigorous science” “committed to an ideal of fully justified knowledge, 
an ideal that the positive sciences fail to live up to since they fail to reflect on their own 
epistemological and metaphysical presuppositions in their exclusive orientation toward 
the acquisition of more and more results.”124 According to Zahavi, “Husserl…argues that 
it is impossible to carry out this investigation [that of philosophical core questions 
concerning the being and nature of reality]…if one simply presupposes and accepts the 
metaphysical and epistemological assumptions that characterize our daily life, which is 
implicitly and unquestionably accepted by all of the positive sciences.”125 We should, 
according to Zahavi in explaining Husserl, “not let preconceived theories form our 
experience, but let our experience determine our theories,” thus specifiying 
phenomenology not as a theory itself, but as a method and a science.126 “Epoché” or 
“bracketing” is Husserl’s prescription for how to do this. “Bracketing,” for him, is not 
effected to “deny, doubt, neglect, abandon, or exclude reality from our research” but 
instead to “suspend or neutralize a certain dogmatic attitude toward reality…to focus 
on… the objects just as they appear.”127 
Zahavi, through Husserl’s Phenomenology, works to dispel a prevailing view of 
Husserl as unable to free himself from the framework of a classical metaphysics of 
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subjectivity, which has caused him to be often considered as having been surpassed by 
his student, Heidegger, and later phenomenologists, in many ways.128 Husserl’s influence 
and significance are complex, as his philosophy was not taught during the Nazi era due to 
his Jewish roots; instead, Heidegger’s phenomenology was, and consequentially, 
Husserl’s phenomenology was often read through the lens of Heidegger.129 Husserl is 
important to consider, however, not solely as a precursor to Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty or 
others, but for the “uniqueness” of his phenomenology that is being appreciated 
especially recently as more of his manuscripts have been published of late.130 This is 
important to keep in mind in moving forward in looking at later philosophers and 
phenomenologists, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and later Shusterman. Each of these 
contributors to this thread of thought, like Dewey and others, remain significant to the 
development of thought on experience, art and phenomenology (and all areas) not only in 
the role they once played in carrying this thread while alive, or through any stagnant or 
cemented position in the past, but in an active way through others’ generation of new 
scholarship, discourse and understandings surrounding their work. In this way, each can 
thus continue to serve as lively participants in this discourse.  
 
Martin Heidegger and “The Origin of the Work of Art” 
Martin Heidegger (1889-1976), regardless of whether or not he ought to be 
thought of as overshadowing his teacher, Husserl, was indeed a key factor in the 
development of phenomenology, publishing “The Origin of The Work of Art” in 1950 
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based off of lectures delivered in the mid 1930’s. The most widely discussed work of 
Heidegger’s philosophy of art, and often taken as the full and complete statement of this 
philosophy, “The Origin of the Work of Art” is truly only the beginning of his path 
towards thinking about art, as we know Heidegger was aware of through his later 
thinking and criticism.131 However, despite its potential “deficiencies,” of which 
Heidegger was also aware, and the fact that it is best understood within the context of 
other texts and Heidegger’s thinking from the same time period, “The Origin of the Work 
of Art” raises some critical issues in approaching art from a phenomenological 
perspective.132 Heidegger’s intention to “disrupt the prevailing theoretical climate” and 
call for a type of art that is not “marginal” or trivial, but that can be instructive on how to 
live, seem to closely resonate with Dewey’s aesthetics as explained in Art as 
Experience.133 He, like Dewey, is also troubled by the division between art and life, art 
and “fine art;” however, he is troubled most by the conception of art having evolved to 
being for the provision of “aesthetic experiences,” which he situates opposite a 
conception of art in which art “provides guidance as to how to live.”134 Because of this, 
his contribution to “creating the possibility of the rebirth of art” varies slightly from 
Dewey’s.135 
For Heidegger in his search for the “Origin of the Work of Art, art is “the 
happening of truth,” and “the artwork is that in and through which ‘truth happens.’”136 
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What is meant by the “happening of truth”? Heidegger seeks to clarify this by replacing 
“happening of truth” with “opening up of world”; in this sense, the artwork becomes 
defined as something that does this: “opens up the world.”137 However, Heidegger 
explains that it cannot do this indefinitely; an artwork may lose its “greatness” or ability 
to “open up the world” if it is removed from its “world” or original setting, (as an art 
object relocated to a museum setting) or if its world “falls” (as the world of ancient 
Greece did around the Parthenon).138 In this sense, the “world” of a work of art is 
incredibly important, constituting, as Heidegger argues, “a ‘framework for the present-at-
hand,’” and as Young describes, “a type of metaphysical map” involving the “regions of 
being” and “kinds of beings” that inhabit it, and it is also internalized by a culture: “to 
understand what one’s world is, then, is to fundamentally understand what, 
fundamentally, there is.”139 In looking at the world this way, at what “there is,” and as a 
structure of beings, the work of art opens up the “being of beings.”140 It is this structure 
of beings that is so important, as it gives meaning and identity to those who belong to it: 
“‘Being-in-the-world’…is knowing where and who you are, and what you have to do.”141 
Art plays such a significant role, then, according to Heidegger, in that it creates 
world, this structure of beings through which meaning and purpose can be found.142 The 
artist, as one of these beings in the world, “‘makes expressly visible’” his or her world, 
and “repeatedly experiences the world ‘for the first time.’”143 Like Husserl, Heidegger 
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believes this world to be non-objective, and like Dewey, that the “‘simple and essential’ 
meanings” which establish our “‘position in the midst of beings,’” and give our lives 
meaning and direction, have been separated from daily life.144 Stulberg notes that for an 
artwork to be “a happening of truth” and to “open up a world,” for the being of things to 
be “unconcealed” by an artwork, the preservers of art are just as important as its 
creators.145 It is they, he notes, who “inhibit all usual doing, knowing and looking…in 
order to linger and stand in the truth that is happening in the work” and in doing so 
transform the work from “the role of a stimulus to experience,” to the role of a special, 
important event. According to Stulberg, “the work comes about as a work only when it is 
fashioned and preserved.”146 In this sense, we can see Dewey’s ideas resonate in the 
value of both the experiences of creating and viewing art, here, in the “unconcealing” of 
the being of things. Ultimately, Heidegger notes that he has not resolved the whole riddle 
of art, but that he has “set forth the riddle for all to ponder and see.”147 
 
The Phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty 
 
Mystery was at the core of the philosophical thought of later phenomenologist 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961): one mystery in particular “surfaces and resurfaces 
throughout his work, implicitly and explicitly…: perception.”148 Referred to as “one of 
the most interesting and original philosophers of the twentieth century,” Merleau-Ponty 
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contributed themes belonging to metaphysics, epistemology, and the philosophy of mind 
through his critique of intellectualism and empiricism, his notion of the bodily nature of 
perception, and his non-representational account of intentionality through his writings 
beginning with The Structure of Behavior, 1938, prominently through his major work 
Phenomenology of Perception, 1945, and through his final, posthumously published 
work, The Visible and the Invisible, 1964.149 Despite Merleau-Ponty’s early death at the 
age of fifty-three in 1961, at a time when he had begun a significant stage in working out 
his philosophy, these two later works especially, Phenomenology of Perception and The 
Visible and the Invisible, have been “incorporated into the celebrated philosophical works 
of our century.”150 
Although his works did not initially receive the same amount of attention as those 
of his contemporaries and friends, including Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir, 
his philosophy, especially his phenomenology, has retained an ongoing relevance in 
diverse fields.151 Influenced by the phenomenology of Husserl, Heidegger, and Gestalt 
psychology, Merleau-Ponty’s most enduring contributions to philosophy, according to 
Carman, “belong to theory—or rather, as the title of his magnum opus has it, the 
phenomenology—of perception.”152 Although Madison claims that the philosophical 
basis for Phenomenology of Perception has long gone into question, and that Merleau-
Ponty’s unfinished The Visible and the Invisible was to “take up, deepen and correct his 
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entire philosophy as he had previously formulated it,” Phenomenology of Perception 
remains critical to include in working towards an understanding of Shusterman’s 
somaesthetics.153 Shusterman engages directly and critically with Merleau-Ponty (as 
“something like the patron saint of the body”154) and his phenomenology and insights 
about the lived body, especially in terms of his own “pragmatist reconstructive dimension 
of somatic theory.”155 
 
Merleau-Ponty’s Aesthetic Philosophy: 
Phenomenology of Perception and “Eye and Mind” 
 
The mystery of perception for Merleau-Ponty, Carman explains through his 
comprehensive account of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy Merleau-Ponty, 2008, lies in the 
fact that it “discloses a world”; indeed, according to Merleau-Ponty, the task of 
phenomenology is “‘to reveal the mystery of the world and the mystery of reason.’”156 
Merleau-Ponty works towards explaining this most thoroughly through his key 1945 
work, Phenomenology of Perception, through which he claimed he “tried, first of all, to 
re-establish the roots of the mind in its body and in its world.”157 Through this text, his 
phenomenology emerges as an attempt to “free the phenomenon of perceived awareness 
from the dominant conception of intentional content as abstract, discursive, and generally 
thought-like” and emphasizes the essential bodily intertwining of perception and the 
perceived world,” grounding perception in the “unity of the human body,” “the material 
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subject of the world,” rather than in sensation or as a function of judgment.158 Having 
been highly influenced by Husserl and Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty’s most important 
contribution, according to Carman, is “his account of perception as neither a subjective 
experience not an objective property of the mind, but an aspect of our being in the 
world.”159 His phenomenology comes about to describe intentionality, the “aboutness” of 
experience (perhaps comparable to the “overarching quality” Dewey speaks of in his own 
idea of aesthetic experience?), in a way that reflects and supports Heidegger’s belief that 
“an ontology of human experience must proceed from a phenomenological description of 
human experience.”160 
Through its discussion of “the body,” “the world as perceived,” and “being-in-
the-world,” Phenomenology of Perception’s “principal discovery is that of the lived 
body,”161 through which we are both open to the world and embedded in it.162 In fact, as 
Merleau-Ponty points out, we have a world only by having a body in it, and the body is 
“‘our anchorage in the world’…a general way of having the world.”163 In this sense, he 
follows that “we shall find in ourselves, and nowhere else, the true meaning of 
phenomenology,” claiming,  
I am the absolute source, my existence does not stem from my 
antecedents, from my physical and social environment; instead it moves 
out towards them and sustains them, for I alone bring into being for myself 
(and therefore into being in the only sense that the word can have for me) 
the tradition which I elect to carry on…164 
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Following this, we can better understand the world as perceived and our place in 
it: “We must not,” Merleau-Ponty warns us “…wonder whether we really perceive a 
world, we must instead say: the world is what we perceive;” not what we think, but what 
we live through.165 We are in communication with this world, and are open to it, but we 
cannot possess it; “it is inexhaustible.”166 Phenomenology, although a study of essences, 
is also, according to Merleau-Ponty, “a philosophy which puts essences back into 
existence, and does not expect to arrive at an understanding of man and the world from 
any starting point other than that of their ‘facticity’”; we are asked to “return to things 
themselves.”167 To do this, to return to “the things themselves,” Merleau-Ponty claims,  
is to return to the world prior to knowledge of which knowledge always 
speaks and in relation to which every scientific determination is abstract, 
indicative, and dependent, like geography in relation to the countryside in 
which we have learned beforehand what a forest, a prairie, or a river 
is…The world is there before any analysis I could carry out…. Perception 
is not a science of the world, it is not even an act, a deliberate taking up of 
a position; it is the background from which all acts stand out, and is 
presupposed by them.168 
 
 
We are called to be childlike, to share in this mentality in which the world is 
believed to be accessible to all around us, and in which perception is understood as the 
“background condition of intelligibility”: a world which we are familiar with “long 
before we are in a position to comprehend the world or ourselves from the depersonalized 
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standpoint of science.”169 Although Merleau-Ponty rejected Husserl’s notion of “epoché” 
or “bracketing” as impossible as a method of returning to a type of “pure” consciousness, 
he did believe there was a wisdom of its own in this world we come to know as children, 
one that is pre-reflective, pre-theoretical.170 
 “Eye and Mind,” as the last essay of Merleau-Ponty’s published in 1961 before 
his untimely death, and republished in 1964, articulates and clarifies his phenomenology 
and aesthetics, and his ideas of lived bodies perceiving and “being in the world” through 
the example of painting. Galen Johnson claims in his introduction to the essay that it 
might be called “Merleau-Ponty’s suicide” due to the philosopher’s seeking to “bring to 
written expression the silent and mute meanings of prereflective brute Being”171; indeed 
the quote of J. Gasquet which Merleau-Ponty commences his investigation with—“‘What 
I am trying to convey to you is more mysterious; it is entwined in the very roots of being, 
in the impalpable source of sensations’”—seems an expression of the philosopher as well 
as the painter.172 Through this challenging task, Merleau-Ponty shows us that it is 
appropriate for a philosophy that attempts to undertake the “prospection of the actual 
world” to investigate painting.173 This is similar to Dewey, except that for Merleau-Ponty 
it is not in terms of modeling “aesthetic experience” but rather because it is “precisely 
this philosophy that animates the painter—not when he expresses his opinions about the 
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world but in that instant his vision becomes gesture…”174: as Cézanne, “he thinks in 
painting.”175 In addressing this issue, “Eye and Mind” addresses more directly what it 
means to have a body, to be open to the world by perception, and what perception is.176 
 Through “Eye and Mind,” Merleau-Ponty continues to oppose understanding the 
world through science alone— a method that is, to him, a construction largely removed 
from the “real world” itself, and dangerously taken as absolute. He calls instead for 
scientific thinking to “return to the ‘there is,’” offering painting as that which “draws 
upon this fabric of brute meaning which operationalism would prefer to ignore…art and 
only art does so in full innocence.”177 For Merleau-Ponty, it is the painter who most fully 
and successfully carries out his idea of the lived body, who “gives himself entirely to 
drawing from the world,” who “‘takes his body with him,’” and “by lending his body to 
the world…changes the world into paintings.”178 To look to the painter is to “go back to 
the working, actual body—not the body as a chunk of space or a bundle or functions but 
that body which is an intertwining of vision and movement.”179 
 It is this connection of vision and movement, “seeing and being seen,” which 
underlies Merleau-Ponty’s ideas of being in the world, “the world” being shared by both 
the visible world and the world of our movement.180 Through an establishment of 
ourselves as being simultaneously visible and “immersed in the visible,” he claims, we 
can approach the world “by looking” and not by appropriating what we see: we can 
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“open onto the world.”181 According to Merleau-Ponty, it is through this that humanity is 
produced: “a human body is present when, between the see-er and the visible, between 
touching and touched, between one eye and the other, between hand and hand a kind of 
crossover occurs…”; it is in this system of exchanges precisely that problems of painting 
can be found.182 In viewing painting, we see “according to it, or with it” rather than 
simply “seeing it,” while in creating a painting, a painter “comes into full possession of 
his vision” by seeing and from vision itself alone.183 While he is painting, any painter 
practices the theory of vision; through this, the “crossover” in which humanity is 
produced here is a purely visual one, as painting “celebrates no other enigma but that of 
visibility.”184 The process of “being in the world,” for the painter, according to Merleau-
Ponty, becomes a totally interactive one akin to breathing in that it consists of inspiration 
and expiration of Being, as the roles of painter and the visible change places; Cézanne is 
the painter whom Merleau-Ponty discusses as exemplifying this.185 
 
Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology and Paul Cézanne 
Sixteen years prior to “Eye and Mind,” Merleau-Ponty dealt with Cézanne and his 
work through his earlier essay on painting, “Cézanne’s Doubt,” 1945, the same year that 
Phenomenology of Perception was published. Although the essay is also partly devoted 
to a study of Leonardo da Vinci through Freud’s Leonardo da Vinci: A Study in 
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Psychosexuality, Merleau-Ponty’s main focus is Cézanne.186 This sustained interest in the 
French painter is no accident. Cézanne, especially through his later landscapes after 1870 
such as Mont Sainte-Victoire, 1885-1887, through his unique method of painting, 
represents not the objects or landscape before him, but his experience of and in the 
world—one constructed by his perception. In doing this, Cézanne exemplifies Merleau-
Ponty’s phenomenology and aesthetics.  
“Painting was his world and his mode of existence,” Merleau-Ponty sets forth 
initially in “Cézanne’s Doubt.”187 Mont Saint-Victoire, near Aix, France, was 
inextricably involved with this world for a considerable time as the physical setting 
which Cézanne perceived, and through which his world came into being. This was a 
place he not only felt deeply connected to as his own “native soil,” but as a landscape 
which he was “deeply in love with,” and which he dealt with frequently, almost 
religiously, with respect to painting in the later years of his career as a persisting 
“motif.”188 For Cézanne, a “motif” was not a beautiful view, but was:  
a configuration of lines or planes discovered when the natural subject is 
seen from a specific viewpoint” where “the same subject seen from a 
different angle offers subject for study of the most powerful interest and so 
varied that I think I could occupy myself for months without changing 
place, by turning now more to the right, now more to the left.189 
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It was what Rubin and Reff defined as “a section of nature encompassed by view 
and for that very reason isolating itself, making a whole of what is a fragment.”190 
Through this repeated inquiry into, transactional engagement with, and synthesis of his 
immediate surroundings through paint, Cézanne truly “takes his body with him,” and 
“gives himself entirely to drawing from the world,” “lending his body to the world” in the 
way that, according to Merleau-Ponty, “the artist changes the world into paintings.”191 
Mont Sainte-Victoire, 1885-1887, one of these paintings and part of Cézanne’s world, 
“where strokes of pulsing color applied with extraordinary freedom and conviction, build 
up an image of the world in continual flux, the land merging with the trees, the trees with 
the sky…,” although a landscape painted later in Cézanne’s career and development, can 
help us to understand Cézanne’s painting as representation of his experience of the world, 
especially as one of the paintings that would define the “consummation of Cézanne’s 
painting”—the “stirring climax of Cézanne’s art.”192 
Cézanne’s painting as representation of his own experience in the world can come 
about through Cézanne himself as a “working, actual body” as defined by Merleau-
Ponty— an “intertwining of vision and movement.”193 Cézanne defined himself this way 
through his daily bodily work and interaction with his environment. Every day, at least 
during his later years in working on landscapes such as Mont Sainte-Victoire, he began 
work early in the morning, worked throughout the day, and especially late afternoon 
painted sur le motif outside, walking to his studio and taking a carriage, or eventually 
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even departing on foot, farther away to a destination from which he would paint, 
traversing winding lanes, thickets of oaks and pines, for at times up to an hour’s walk, 
totally immersing himself as a body in the motif he would then paint.194 It was here, as a 
body situated in nature, that Cézanne would fully become an “intertwining of vision and 
movement,”195 more than as with any other previous style or method of painting he had 
involved himself with; it is here in which he defined himself as “steeping himself 
serenely in this world of the eye,” “a man who dwells with his perceptions.”196  
Here, working in and from nature, painting became for Cézanne “the exact study 
of appearances” rather than as imagined scenes or the projection of dreams; this was 
thanks to the Impressionists, especially Pissarro, a revered friend, teacher and father 
figure for Cézanne.197 As Meyer Schapiro’s 1965 critical account of Cézanne’s painting 
emphasizes, through the valuable years Cézanne spent as an apprentice to the painter nine 
years his senior, “Pissarro taught Cézanne a method of slow, patient painting directly 
from nature. It was a discipline in seeing,” and one that was unique from the type of truth 
of perception Impressionism afforded.198 While Impressionism tried to capture “the very 
way in which objects strike our eyes and attack our senses,” using a limited palette and 
color contrasts to modify local colors in nature, restoring a type of truth of the impression 
through the juxtaposition of separate parts and tones, Cézanne, although influenced by 
these ideas and values, seems to have had a different aim.199 Cézanne, through his much 
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more inclusive palette of eighteen colors, including earth tones normally excluded by the 
Impressionists, does not sacrifice the weight of the object through a breaking up of its 
tone or through losing it in its relationships to the air and other objects, but rather, 
according to Merleau-Ponty, seeks to “find it again behind the atmosphere”; he sought to 
“return to the object without abandoning the impressionistic aesthetic which takes nature 
as its model.”200 In Mont Saint-Victoire, we can see the influence of Impressionist ideas 
through the juxtaposition of complimentary and contrasting colors— peachy hues tending 
toward oranges set off cooler shadows of blue violet on the mountain’s face, while 
collections of strokes of brighter yellow-orange pair with blue violet to define fields and 
homes below. We are not, however, confronted with an impression of the mountain as an 
ephemeral weightless relationship of air, objects and space, separate strokes to form an 
overall atmosphere. Rather, Mont Sainte-Victoire reveals itself to us in its full identity as 
mountain, solid, which Cézanne’s multidirectional strokes define to us not as a moment, 
but as a complex compilation of many moments, all of the moments of Cézanne’s act of 
painting and looking.  
Cézanne, then, was involved in a “discipline of seeing” different than that of the 
Impressionists, his contemporaries. More than they, he emerges as a Being, a body in 
Merleau-Ponty’s terms, “immersed in the visible by his body, himself visible,” 
simultaneously seeing, being seen, opening onto the world, and “caught in the fabric of 
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the world.”201 His painting is, according to Schapiro, a “more direct instrument of the 
self.”202  
Cézanne achieves this through a “dedication to the visual as a complete world 
grasped directly as a structure of tones.”203 Mont Sainte-Victoire emerges in Mont Sainte-
Victoire, 1885-1887, according to Schapiro in “changing colors from point to point” in 
which “all seems to flicker”: “layers intricately fitted and interlocked,” “a contrast of 
movements, of the marginal and centered, of symmetry and unbalance,” yet “deep 
harmony, built with a wonderful finesse.”204 This color and depth Cézanne claims “are 
there only because they awaken an echo in our bodies and because the body welcomes 
them,” and that “nature is on the inside.”205 Through this, we can begin to understand the 
buzzing collection of patches of tones, varying in their direction, that construct Cézanne’s 
mountain. It is not just the mountain they construct, but something to do with Cézanne 
himself: his perception, his seeing of the mountain, as they are there “only because they 
awaken an echo” in Cézanne’s body, and it is only through his body’s welcoming of them 
which they are made manifest. In this sense, Cézanne’s body becomes integral to his 
painting in that it is only through his body that he perceives the world around him, 
through which vision and movement are intertwined. 
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Figure 4: Paul Cézanne, Mont Sainte-Victoire (1885-1887). Oil on canvas. 26 x 35 3/8”. 
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It is through these multi-directional areas of tone which we can understand 
Cézanne’s work, his understanding of the landscape around him, not as immediately 
complete, but as composed of many moments, parts and perceptions—both within each 
specific construction of Mont Sainte-Victoire in color, and in the time spent constructing 
this particular landscape itself again and again. It is not the object, the mountain, fully 
formed as in the instantaneous moment of a photograph, or even the sensation and 
perception of the object itself, which is at stake, constructed and dealt with by Cézanne 
for so many years, but Cézanne’s experience of and in this world, his perceiving and 
being in the world, which emerges through the coming into being of views of Mont 
Sainte-Victoire such as these. Pavel Machotka emphasizes this clearly through his 
extensive comparison of Cézanne’s painted landscapes to the physical motifs themselves 
as he has located and photographed them in 1996. Through these images— the complete, 
static and instantaneous image of Mont Saint-Victoire given to us in the pictorially 
unified perceptive system of a photograph, compared to the composite view of the 
mountain provided by Cézanne, we can see how “paintings such as these help clarify 
once again how Cézanne understood pictorial space in relation to real space: he did not 
flatten it in any simple manner, but controlled its overall depth or modulated our 
progression into it by discrete steps.”206 We can see Cézanne’s vision of the mountain 
unlike a composition “which obeys the laws and methods of Alberti’s perspective…the 
spatial container does not exist prior to its contents and it is not distinct from them; it is 
on the very existence of the latter that the whole figurative construction depends”; 
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“Cézannian space is no longer space indifferent to its contents,” but one in which he 
“tries to synthesize in a single vision…the successive moments of a temporal 
continuity.”207 These successive moments captured—the patches of pink, violet and blue 
forming the faces of Mont Sainte-Victoire, similar to the patches of directionally varied 
strokes that form the sky—reveal to us more about the way in which Cézanne 
experienced this landscape, the way he, as a body, perceived it, than they do about the 
objects and this landscape itself. Just as Merleau-Ponty described perceiving the paintings 
at the caves of Lascaux, saying “I do not look at it as one looks at a thing, fixing it in its 
place…my gaze wanders within it as in the halos of Being. Rather than seeing it, I see 
according to, or with it,” so don’t we see “with” Cézanne’s work, just as Cézanne see 
“with” his world, his landscape.208 
According to Merleau-Ponty, “painting celebrates no other enigma but that of 
visibility,” and “the painter, any painter, while he is painting, practices a magical theory 
of vision.”209 Cézanne, through depicting his experience of the world and perception of it 
through Mont Sainte-Victoire, does this most of all.210 “‘The landscape thinks itself in 
me,’ he said, ‘and I am its consciousness’”; according to Merleau-Ponty, “the painter 
recaptures and converts into visible objects what would, without him, remain closed up in 
the separate life of each consciousness: the vibration of appearances which is the cradle 
of things.”211 Cézanne not only represents, through his work, the way in which he 
experiences the world—phenomenologically—but does so in a way that is meaningful to 
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us as viewers; “a painter like Cézanne, an artist, or a philosopher, must not only create 
and express an idea, but must also awaken the experiences which will make the idea take 
root in the consciousness of others…if a work is successful, it has the strange power of 
being self-teaching.”212 Through Cézanne’s work, not only are we offered a means of 
understanding the way in which he experienced the world, through his own perception 
and phenomenological engagement, but also what this way of experiencing the world 
entails in itself, and how we, ourselves, experience our own worlds.  
The way in which Cézanne paints, especially in his later works, seems to provide 
one response, one echo, to Merleau-Ponty’s call for scientific thinking to return to the 
“there is” as discussed in “Eye and Mind.”213 Although Cézanne’s later paintings, such as 
Mont Sainte-Victoire, are themselves constructions such as Merleau-Ponty reminds us of 
science as being, they are constructions whose grounds have returned firmly to the “there 
is.”214 Despite claims of Cézanne’s painting as detached and objective, in his return to the 
“there is” through his painting his perception and experience of the world, and through 
his position as “part of the landscape”215 himself, not distanced, he instead exemplifies 
Merleau-Ponty’s definition of humanity, of the presence of the human body, in his 
crossover between the see-er and the visible, between the sensing and the sensible216 
Cézanne, Schapiro notes, maintains a “characteristic meditativeness and detachment from 
desire,” as well as a tendency towards “the experience of the qualities of things without 
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regard to their use or cause or consequence.”217 Although what may be termed an 
aesthetic attitude has been seen instead as objective detachment, Cézanne, through his 
experience with the world and painting of this experience, is truly attached to the directly 
visible world “as his sole object for meditation.”218 This tension between Cézanne’s 
seemingly (and perhaps truly, in some ways) detached attitude towards painting and his 
deeply engaged interaction with it in painting, and commitment to paint nature “in 
complete naiveté of sensation, as if no one had painted it before,” opens some interesting 
questions, and presents Cézanne as a unique representative of Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology in emerging as both seemingly scientific (objective) and basically human 
(subjective).219 In this sense, perhaps he has achieved Merleau-Ponty’s call for a science 
returned to the “there is” and a philosophy of what Merleau-Ponty described as being in 
the world.220 Overall, according to Schapiro, Cézanne is able to make his “sensing, 
probing, doubting, finding activity a visible part of the painting and to endow this 
intimate, personal aspect with the same qualities of noble order as the world that he has 
imagined”—he is able to make visible the way he experiences the world, the “coming 
into being” of that which he paints through his perceptions and “constructive operations,” 
a way that is phenomenological in the sense of Merleau-Ponty.221 This in itself is 
compelling in that it teaches us about the experience of painting and art in general. 
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Phenomenology and Rackstraw Downes 
Cézanne had painted Mont Sainte-Victoire fifty-eight years before Merleau-Ponty 
would embark upon “Cézanne’s Doubt,” and seventy-seven years before “Eye and Mind” 
would be published, already making him a figure of the past for Merleau-Ponty looking 
back. But what of this space and time since Cézanne—and since Merleau-Ponty? Have 
there been other painters who emphasize this way of being in the world in a similar way? 
 Upon first inspection, a contemporary landscape by American painter Rackstraw 
Downes, such as Water Flow Monitoring Installations on the Rio Grande Near Presidio, 
TX (5-Part Painting), 2002-3, might suggest, in response to this question, “no, not here.” 
This landscape in five parts, each at least 3.5 feet in width, and about two feet in height, 
seems to oppose all that Cézanne stood for with respect to phenomenology: despite 
Downes’ vehement refusal to use photography in making his paintings, this landscape 
seems to us almost photorealistic, the mountainous forms at the periphery of the flood 
plains appearing to us seemingly all at once, an instantaneous whole, opposite of the  
jarring strokes of planes of color forming Cézanne’s Mont Sainte-Victoire. However, 
further inquiry into Downes as a painter prompts us to withhold this initial response. 
Rackstraw Downes, having emigrated from England to emerge as a unique American 
landscape painter especially during the second half of the twentieth century, began 
painting landscapes in 1965, shortly after “Eye and Mind” was published.222 Already 
removed from the all-important painting of his time, abstract painting, by painting 
representationally, and selecting for his subject the landscape, Downes further distanced  
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Figure 5: Downes, Rackstraw Water-Flow Monitoring Installations on the Rio Grande Near Presidio, TX 
(5-Part Painting): Part 2: Facing South, The Flood-Plain from East of the Gauge Shelter, 10 A.M. (2002-3). 
Oil on canvas, 28.5 x 48” (72.4 x 121.9 cm). 
 
himself from the popular movement of the time by insisting on painting from life, out of 
doors in the landscape itself. These plein air paintings are hardly on a scale Cézanne 
could have carried on his hour’s walk to his site, some measuring up to ten feet wide, 
though frequently less than two feet tall. Water-Flow Monitoring Installations on the Rio 
Grande Near Presido, TX, a five-part painting, would total over seventeen feet stretched 
end to end; despite the image’s seeming instantaneousness and wholeness, we cannot 
perceive it this way except from a distance: “difficult to absorb fully at once…the eye can 
take them in only piecemeal” or else, from a distance, where the detail is lost.223 Even in 
his own perception in the act of painting, Downes’ turning of his head in forming such a 
wide panorama results in his preference for the curved edges of the horizon, a unique 
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effect. It is this—his own act of painting and dealing with perception—that forms a link 
with Cézanne, one hundred years his senior.  
 Like Cézanne, for Downes, “picture-making is, to begin with, a faithful record of 
exactly what he sees before him as he sets up his easel in precisely the same spot day 
after day…and sometimes to keep returning to the site over a period of two, even three 
years.”224 Although he takes for his subjects the banal and the overlooked as opposed to 
Cézanne’s taking on of his beloved home, selecting underbellies of freeways, 
unremarkable New York City street corners, dumps, construction sites, etc., Downes is 
no less involved “in every aspect of the here and now.”225 In fact, according to Schwartz, 
“Downes’ thoughts add up to a many-sided brief for seeing experience…through more 
‘empirical’ and less ideological eyes”: “virtually all of Downes’ paintings since the early 
1970’s are about his experience as he charts what he sees when he moves his head from 
left to right or from down to up.”226 His works, though not fractured by color or space, 
deal with the same concerns with perception, experience, and “being in the world” on 
which Merleau-Ponty focused; they are, according to Schwartz, “fundamentally about the 
man in the center who is doing the looking”227 and who turns “the experience of looking 
at a painting into a process of nailing down a slippery prey.”228 In describing the task of 
Downes, this “man in the center,” Storr claims: 
Painting is about ideas, surely, but it is about looking first and last, about 
the effect of consciousness of banishing preconception and awakening 
one’s visual faculties to their fullest degree, of paying attention, of 
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noticing, of wondering at, of recognizing, of verifying, and then of starting 
over from scratch as if one had seen nothing the first time. That is what 
Rackstraw Downes does, and that is what his pictures demand that we, the 
viewers, do.229 
 
 
Storr notes that Downes’ subject is the way we occupy space, and he negotiates 
this through the format of his painting: so wide we cannot possibly take it all in, or 
perceive it in total, from as close as one might normally approach a painting. He also 
negotiates this through his act of painting, his process of recording the details of the 
world around him as he himself perceives them, treating the canvas with an overall 
heightened level of detail that is just as implausible realistically as Cézanne’s jarring 
patches of color. Downes refers to this as empiricism; for him, by “reversing the 
trajectory of painting away from fragmentation” other equally revealing phenomena 
become visible, including the limits on our own perception and cognition in time.230 His 
canvases are not, then, as realistic as they appear, as they evoke what Storr terms the state 
of “lived duration,” in which cyclical periods of time pass again and again as Downes 
perceives and paints.231 In relationship to not only space, but especially to time, Downes 
is establishing his own “being in the world” through his bodily work of painting, and 
himself claims “to any diagram I prefer—and trust—the experience-based statement of 
Cézanne”: “‘for progress toward realization there is only nature, and the eye is educated 
by contact with her. It becomes concentric by force of looking and working.’”232 The 
influence of Cézanne and the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty seems not only to have 
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been connected to Downes’ work, but also to have reached and reverberated within the 
world of art in the years following the publishing of “Eye and Mind.” Perhaps there is a 
truth in these ideas more compelling than movements that have come to pass since. 
Downes expresses this well in describing his own method of working and his identity as 
an artist: “some artists’ preoccupations are like circulatory or muscular systems, not 
sheddable skins.”233 Ultimately, the body itself can be seen as defining this experience of 
being in the world; it is not only the “there is” that must be returned to, but, as Richard 
Shusterman recognized and took on, the body itself.  
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Part Three: Richard Shusterman’s Somaesthetics 
 
We now follow the thread of art and experience to the center for Body, Mind and 
Culture at Florida State University, Boca Raton, present day, to the office of one 
particular lived body, Richard Shusterman, in more detail. Having emerged as a public 
intellect for his work in somaesthetics, Shusterman has become recognized 
internationally for his contributions in philosophy and this pioneering work in his 
proposed discipline of somaesthetics, his Pragmatist Aesthetics having been translated 
into over thirteen languages.  
The extensive breadth and depth of the concepts and aspects of Shusterman’s 
project of somaesthetics, from his turn away from analytic philosophy towards 
pragmatism through to his current thought, certainly deserve more attention than this 
account provides; they are far-reaching, developing and finessing a thorough, all-
inclusive explanation of his proposed discipline, and address a variety of topics. 
However, I hope here not to address all aspects and topics included under this rich new 
proposed discipline, but to create an understanding of Shusterman’s philosophy of 
somaesthetics through which it will be possible to approach art, especially contemporary 
art. In this sense, I hope to inquire into somaesthetics in a way that will allow for its 
understanding as a tool with which to approach contemporary art. In doing this, I cannot 
discuss the scope of his philosophical work and thought on the development of this 
discipline over the past thirty years, but will instead focus on two of Shusterman’s texts 
critical to an understanding of his proposal of somaesthetics, as they embody and 
encapsulate the central aims and aspects of this philosophy: “Somaesthetics: A 
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Disciplinary Proposal” (1999) and Body Consciousness: A Philosophy of Mindfulness and  
Somaesthetics (2008). 
In approaching Richard Shusterman’s somaesthetics, it is helpful to turn first to 
his essay, “Somaesthetics: A Disciplinary Proposal” (1999). Published seven years 
following his popular Pragmatist Aesthetics, in the Journal of Aesthetics and Criticism, 
this essay serves as Shusterman’s early identification, establishment, and clarification of 
his idea and project of somaesthetics as a proposed new philosophical sub-discipline. It is 
here where we can gather, from Shusterman’s own clarifications, the true aims and 
central concepts of somaesthetics as defined by the philosopher himself, through which 
we will later be able to apply in approaching art. Although a wealth of scholarship could 
be (and is beginning to be) devoted to the many aspects and wide-ranging implications of 
Shusterman’s somaesthetics and its connections to other disciplines and issues, I aim to 
focus on its potential utility in approaching art and for contemporary art in particular, and 
will therefore first focus on an understanding of Shusterman’s somaesthetics at its core, 
which Shusterman’s 1999 proposal outlines. 
 In this text, Shusterman sets out to revive the idea of aesthetics as “a life-
improving cognitive discipline that extends far beyond questions of beauty and fine arts 
and involves theory and practical exercise,” and to end its neglect of the body, both 
introduced with Baumgarten at the outset of modern aesthetics.234 He aims to propose “a 
somatically centered field, somaesthetics, that can contribute significantly to many 
crucial philosophical concerns, thus enabling philosophy to more successfully redeem its 
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original role as an art of living.”235 He defines somaesthetics provisionally as “the 
critical, meliorative study of the experience and use of one’s body as a locus of sensory-
aesthetic appreciation (aisthesis) and creative self-fashioning,” which is therefore 
committed to the “knowledge, discourses, practices, and bodily disciplines that structure 
such somatic care or can improve it.”236 Shusterman recognizes that he is not the first to 
propose this— rather, that consideration of the body and its importance has ancient roots 
in philosophy in the likes of Socrates and other Greek philosophers as well as in Eastern 
thought, and discussion of the body with respect to many issues already exists. He 
perceives his role as being to restore this concern of the body to what he believes is its 
rightful place as part of the core of the discipline of aesthetics, working to disassemble 
the long-upheld mind-body dualism (of which “body” has been excluded) that has been 
pervasive since Baumgarten’s conception of modern aesthetics, and to unify, structure, 
and integrate already-existing somatic discourse into “a more productively systematic 
field.”237 This is valuable to philosophy, he argues, especially as by looking from the 
somaesthetic philosophical perspective, we can improve our knowledge of the world; we 
can do this by perfecting our bodily senses and “by an improved direction of one’s 
body.”238 
How exactly are we to set about doing this, that is, perfecting our bodily senses 
and directing our bodies, and what is meant by “the experience and use of one’s 
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body”?239 Shusterman identifies this as being twofold through two non-exclusive modes 
important to somaesthetics: the body’s representation as well as its lived experience. He 
borrows Kant’s term “representation” here to refer to the body (our own, or of another) as 
an object grasped by our external senses; the body as external form and appearance, the 
mode he claims tends to be more dominant in our culture.240 By the body’s lived 
experience and experiential somaesthetics, Shusterman refers not to the body as external 
object, but rather, harking back to Merleau-Ponty, the “experience of one’s own body 
from within,” “the aesthetic quality of its ‘inner’ experience.”241 In addition to these two 
modes, Shusterman identifies three main dimensions to somaesthetics: analytic, 
pragmatic, and practical somaesthetics.  
The analytic dimension refers to the theoretical dimension that “describes the 
basic nature of bodily perceptions and practices and also of their function in our 
knowledge and construction of reality” and allows for the opening up of and extending 
out to broader topics such as society and power, as Foucault has done.242 Pragmatic 
somaesthetics, in contrast, is prescriptive rather than descriptive, “proposing specific 
methods of somatic improvement and engaging in their comparative critique,” and 
always presupposes the analytic dimension.243 Going beyond analysis, pragmatic 
somaesthetics propose applicable methods to improve the bodily senses and our lived 
experience previously discussed by “remaking the body and society.”244 These “methods” 
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could consist of anything from the practices of yoga, creating art, or dance to diverse 
diets and psychosomatic therapies, and can serve to enrich the quality of our experience, 
and also “make our awareness of somatic experience more acute and perceptive.”245 The 
actual practice of these varying methodologies make up Shusterman’s “practical 
somaesthetics.”246 
 It is the actual practice—the “body work”—of these methods which is key to 
somaesthetics, Shusterman argues; it is through this critical dimension, most often 
neglected by body philosophers, he says, which the project of somaesthetics as a sub-
discipline of aesthetics and philosophy is itself considered a way of life and “embodied 
practice” by Shusterman, far more than just theory.247 In this way, somaesthetics emerges 
as exciting—although pushing the boundaries of the discipline of aesthetics in all that it 
encompasses, it calls for a broader reconsideration of philosophy as something more than 
theory, and instead as defined by collaboration between thinkers and practitioners.248 It is 
through this that we can begin to understand somaesthetics as highly applicable to art—a 
discipline that inherently involves both practice and theory.  
Somaesthetics, then, becomes instructive not just in the appreciation of art, but in 
its performance, and in the process of creating itself: “if it is foreign to most philosophy 
departments, this broad conception of aesthetic discipline is familiarly at work in other 
academies—those of music, art, dance, and cooking,” Shusterman reminds us.249 How 
somaesthetics is and will be categorized and demarcated as a discipline is yet to be 
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determined; it is still growing, and it will be defined by this collective work of thinkers 
and practitioners alike. According to Shusterman, the issue of its categorization and 
boundaries within philosophy ought to be far less of a concern than somaesthetics 
itself.250 For this paper, my inquiry will involve Shusterman’s somaesthetics, as a sub-
discipline of aesthetics within philosophy with these three dimensions and two modes 
with respect to contemporary art.  
Although the union of Shusterman’s three dimensions of somaesthetics, the 
analytical, pragmatic and practical, may seem ambitious or difficult, Shusterman 
highlights John Dewey as exemplary to somaesthetics in his working with all three 
dimensions. Tracing the thread of art and experience himself back to Dewey, Shusterman 
emphasizes Dewey’s theory of “body-mind” (indeed it is this unity which Shusterman 
aims to achieve through somaesthetics), pragmatic study of this concept and the modern 
body discipline and therapy, the Alexander Technique, and twenty years of personal 
practice of this technique. In this, Shusterman argues, Dewey embodies the three-
dimensional discipline of somaesthetics, and truly the idea of philosophy as a way of life, 
“a disciplined aesthetic practice whose greatest artwork is our self.”251 In this sense, we 
are all artists, and somaesthetics can be useful and instructive for our own creation of self 
as well as a tool for better appreciating art. Overall, according to Shusterman, 
somaesthetics affirms the line between aesthetics and the living soma, and can thus 
achieve a “robust, full-bodied vitality.”252 Just as Shusterman argues here in his early 
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proposal for somaesthetics’ revitalization of aesthetics, I would like to argue for its 
potential revitalization of art.  
Nine years and tens of works on somaesthetics later, a further comprehensively 
defined somaesthetics can be found in Shusterman’s Body Consciousness: A Philosophy 
of Mindfulness and Somaesthetics, 2008. Shusterman himself has since worked towards 
his earlier-outlined pragmatic dimension of the discipline here through his dealing with 
the ideas of six key body philosophers— Michel Foucault, Maurice-Merleau-Ponty, 
Simone de Beauvoir, Ludwig Wittgenstein, William James and John Dewey—and their 
somatic philosophies, with the aim of proposing and encouraging improved body 
consciousness as a means to “enhance one’s knowledge, performance, and pleasure” and 
relieve some of the suffering we undergo in contemporary culture related to the body 
(such as stress, overstimulation, personal and social discontents).253  
Here, Shusterman continues to advocate the pragmatism he argued for through his 
dealing with Dewey in Pragmatist Aesthetics, in 1992, putting “experience at the heart of 
philosophy,” celebrating “the living, sentient body as the organizing core of experience,” 
and committing himself fully to the discipline not only through his outpour of scholarship 
on the subject, but through the practical somaesthetics of pursuits such as his own Zen 
training in Japan, practice of the Feldenkrais Method of somatic education and therapy.254 
Through this we can see the combined influence of Dewey’s value of experience as 
central and Merleau-Ponty’s situation of the living body as the “organizing core” of 
experience, but the relationship of these two philosophers to Shusterman’s somaesthetics 
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is worth further inquiry. Although Shusterman’s chapters on the ideas of each 
philosopher provide critical insight into the wide scope of somaesthetics and its 
methodologies as Shusterman tests his proposed sub-discipline with respect to each of 
these various body philosophers’ thought, his ideas of somaesthetics with respect to 
Merleau-Ponty in Chapter Two, “The Silent, Limping Body of Philosophy: Somatic 
Attention Deficit in Merleau-Ponty” and Chapter Six, “Redeeming Somatic Reflection: 
John Dewey’s Philosophy of Body-Mind will be most helpful in addressing and 
approaching contemporary art with and through somaesthetics.  
The importance of these two philosophers to Shusterman’s development and 
refining of somaesthetics comes not from absolute affirmation or adoption of their ideas, 
but from Shusterman’s qualification of their philosophies, dealing critically with them, 
and working to position somaesthetics in relation to them—not necessarily in line with 
them, but sometimes against them. In “The Silent, Limping Body of Philosophy: Somatic 
Attention Deficit in Merleau-Ponty,” Shusterman develops his value of somaesthetic 
reflection. To do this, he qualifies Merleau-Ponty’s somatic philosophy by recognizing 
his critical contribution, especially as a strong part of the foundation of his own concept 
of somaesthetics, but ultimately criticizing his resistance to somaesthetic reflection, and 
seeks instead to establish through somaesthetics a “more practical, reconstructive 
pragmatist approach to somatic philosophy.”255 Shusterman takes away from Merleau-
Ponty as important his celebrating “the primacy and sufficiency of unreflective, ‘primary 
consciousness.’”256 This also serves as challenging to Shusterman’s somaesthetics in 
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some ways, and so it is taken up not only to be used in support of somaesthetics, but in 
part as something for Shusterman to react against, like Pollock with Benton’s style of 
painting. Unlike Pollock’s claimed rejection of his mentor’s style, however, 
Shusterman’s reaction against Merleau-Ponty is not a stated rejection or total opposition, 
but a positioning; Shusterman does not try to distinguish himself totally from Merleau-
Ponty, but instead acknowledges this influence and positions somaesthetics with respect 
to Merleau-Ponty’s dialogue in proposing his own philosophy.  
This major aspect of Merleau-Ponty’s thought that Shusterman maintains as 
crucial within somaesthetics is his affirmation of “the existence and restoration of a 
primordial perception or experience of the world that lies below the level of reflective or 
thematized consciousness and beneath all language and concepts”; “our basic unreflective 
intentionality that silently and spontaneously organizes our world of perception.”257. 
While Shusterman holds to the importance of this, he does not wish to uphold the second 
part of Merleau-Ponty’s definition: “…without the need of distinct perceptual 
representations and without any explicitly conscious deliberation.”258 Although this pre-
reflective perception is an important part of the foundation of body consciousness and 
somaesthetics, it is only a part, and cannot be taken as the totality of body consciousness, 
especially, Shusterman argues, in that it is not instructive in the pragmatic or practical 
ways that he advocates. Instead, it merely describes our perception and experience of the 
world, but does not offer us any practical means of improving or dealing with this 
experience. In this sense, Merleau-Ponty’s “silent, limping body” of philosophy can be 
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seen as forming a beginning and important aspect of somaesthetics for Shusterman, but 
also an important platform to depart from in thinking about how to build off of this 
philosophy and apply it practically to life in focusing on “examining and sharpening our 
consciousness of one’s actual bodily feelings and actions so that we can deploy such 
somatic reflection to know ourselves better and achieve a more perceptive somatic self-
consciousness to guide us toward better self-use.”259 Shusterman thus believes in habit’s 
somatic base, like Merleau-Ponty, but also in body consciousness’ ability to correct or 
change habits, and to “improve unreflective behavior that hinders our experience and 
performance,” and builds his idea of “lived somaesthetic reflection” off of and out from 
Merleau-Ponty’s ideas.260 While Merleau-Ponty desired a return to a “pure, primordial 
state of unified experience” and prereflective unity, opposing a division of reflective 
consciousness and representational thinking, Shusterman offers a new solution to this in 
calling for “practical methods for individuals to improve their somatic consciousness and 
functioning.”261 
In Shusterman’s sixth and final chapter of Body Consciousness, “Redeeming 
Somatic Reflection: John Dewey’s Philosophy of Body-Mind,” involves a final finessing 
of somaesthetics by looking at and through the ideas of John Dewey and his influences. 
For Shusterman, Dewey was one of the philosophers who went the furthest towards the 
integration of practical methods with theory to improve somatic consciousness and 
functioning: “Dewey wisely affirmed somatic reflection for both theory and practice,” 
and thus perhaps even served as a model for Shusterman himself as a philosopher this 
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way.262 What Shusterman takes as important from Dewey for his refining of 
somaesthetics comes from Dewey’s idea of “body-mind,” the importance of habit, 
transactional self, and practical applications (for Shusterman’s practical dimension of 
somaesthetics) through a closer look at Dewey’s influences— both his reliance on and 
distinguishing himself from his major influences F.M. Alexander and William James. 
Shusterman argues here that Alexander, developer of the “Alexander Technique” which 
Dewey would come to practice and advocate and instrumental to understanding Dewey’s 
philosophy, was perhaps not completely beneficial to Dewey; rather, for his 
somaesthetics, he desires Dewey’s somatic theory to have been distanced more clearly 
from Alexander’s views.  
Shusterman takes as important to his somaesthetics Dewey’s opposition to 
dualistic thinking, especially with respect to body and mind, and thus takes his concept of 
“mind-body” as crucial: the desired goal of “dynamic, harmonious functioning that we 
should continually strive to attain” and which also depends on social unity.263 This goal, 
for Dewey, takes not only individual effort, but “societal reconstruction,” where “the 
integration of mind-body in action” is most important; mental and bodily reactions are 
not separate, but are “already enveloped in the primal unity of purposive behavior.”264  
This purposive behavior and mind-body action, according to Dewey as 
highlighted by Shusterman, depends on our habits of feeling, thinking and acting.265 
While maintaining the significance of spontaneity that Merleau-Ponty cultivates, 
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Shusterman takes from Dewey the fact that it is our habits which spontaneously perform 
our will and make up the self, our habits coupled with our means of bodily movement; 
this Dewey draws from Alexander.266 Shusterman takes on the spirit of Dewey and 
Alexander in his somaesthetics through this recognition of the connection between will 
and habit, and prompts us to reconsider what is gathered from Merleau-Ponty through 
these philosophers’ ideas on what “free” spontaneous action truly entails—the 
conditioning by habit—and their emphasis on inhibition as a crucial tool for correcting 
these habits and improving our use of the self by allowing us to do this and teach 
ourselves new ones.267 Through this, inhibition is developed as key to somatic 
reflection.268 
Overall, Shusterman is critical of Alexander’s failure to address current science 
pertaining to his research and philosophy including posture, movement and mind (as this 
could have been greatly supplemented and enriched by scientific knowledge and 
interdisciplinary research) and his failure to test his theories through standard 
experimentation and analysis.269 He supports Dewey’s recognition of the limitations of 
the conscious reflection that Alexander advocated (one in which total conscious control is 
possible), and that somatic consciousness and reflection is a refined, intelligent habit in 
itself which must be learned.270 He does this especially in recognizing Dewey’s departure 
from Alexander on the topic of the arts— activities that were for Alexander dangerous, 
especially for children, in that they “speak most powerfully to the most primitive, savage 
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parts of us,” as he championed a radically rationalist ideal that “rejects any reliance on 
emotions or spontaneous feelings for guiding behavior.”271 Shusterman argues that 
Dewey didn’t distance himself enough from Alexander on this, and, while taking up ideas 
of these philosophers, sets out to takes these steps in forming this distance himself 
through somaesthetics.272 To do this, he proposes a strategy of “rigorous practical work in 
critical somaesthetic self-consciousness” to discern how to correct our habits, the use of a 
“pluralistic toolbox of somatic disciplines,” and the help of others (especially teachers of 
these various methods).273 
We cannot expect, perhaps, as Alexander does, to transcend all disease and 
physical disabilities through our reasoning and deliberate consciousness; we are instead, 
as Dewey recognizes, shaped and influenced by our environments, have less control than 
Alexander believes, and, as selves, are truly “transactional.”274 This idea of the 
transactional self, in fluid exchange between world and self, Shusterman takes from 
Dewey as significant, especially in his own practice of not only analytical and pragmatic 
somaesthetics, but especially in practical somaesthetics, particularly through his largest 
public application of this practical dimension through curating the 2012 exhibition, 
Aesthetic Transactions.  
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Aesthetic Transactions, 2012 
In attempting to further his commitment to remaining open to new experiences, 
challenges, and interdisciplinary projects, and to practically applying his philosophy, 
Shusterman accepted the offer to curate an art show in 2012 at the Michel Journiac 
Gallery to accompany a conference at the Sorbonne in France honoring the twentieth 
anniversary of the publication of Pragmatist Aesthetics: Living Beauty, Rethinking Art.275 
There, through the visible and physical uniting of theory and practice, Shusterman 
worked to emphasize the transactional experience of his pragmatism— the very aspects 
of Dewey’s philosophy he highlighted as important four years previous in Body 
Consciousness. He defines transactional experience as “double barreled”: 
First, it underlines that experience is not something confined to the 
interiority of human consciousness but necessarily involves or 
incorporates the subject’s environment, both through the active 
engagement and more passive absorption of environing conditions and 
energies. Transactional experience also connotes the idea of experiments 
in transcending disciplinary boundaries, transgressing entrenched 
dichotomies, and transforming established concepts or topics, together 
with the idea that these transactions can succeed in advancing both theory 
and practice through the experiences and lessons that such experiments 
induce.276 
 
Admittedly personal in nature, as a physical manifestation and putting into 
practice of Shusterman’s somaesthetics, Aesthetic Transactions featured the work of 
seven artists dealing with somaesthetics and the theme of aesthetic transactions, many 
explicitly and having sought out Shusterman themselves. Through this, they present a 
variety of interesting means of connecting somaesthetics not just to life and lived 
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experience, but directly through art. The artists, Luca del Baldo of Italy, Carsten Höller, 
working in Sweden, Tatiana Trouvé, working in Paris, Thecla Schiphorst of Canada, 
ORLAN of France and working in New York and Los Angeles, Pan Gongkai of China, 
and Yann Toma of France, represent a range of contemporary art from traditional oil 
painting to installation, performance and photography to engage with this theme of 
aesthetic transactions and active somatic engagement in a host of different ways, some 
even including Shusterman himself in the creation process.  
Although somaesthetics can be used as a tool through which to think about a wide 
variety of contemporary art, the artworks included in Aesthetic Transactions by these 
seven artists represent a sampling of work which was directly and intentionally related to 
his somaesthetics, having even been approved by Shusterman himself. In this way, they 
provide for us a solid medium through which to examine the application of somaesthetics 
to contemporary art, and for this reason, I will analyze the work of two artists in the show 
in terms of somaesthetics: how can somaesthetics be important to contemporary art? How 
might it allow us to think about contemporary art, and how can it be used as a tool in 
approaching art today? I hope that through closer analysis of and inquiry into the 
“Radiant Flux” photography of Yann Toma, and the installations of Tatiana Trouvé, 
Polder Installations, and Untitled trees, we might be able to better answer these 
questions, and find meaningful ways to approach further contemporary art through 
somaesthetics.  
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Yann Toma: Somaflux, 2010 
Perhaps a most interesting example of somaesthetics put into action (quite literally) 
through Aesthetic Transactions can be found in the photographs of Paris-based artist 
Yann Toma, titled Somaflux, somaesthetics with Richard Shusterman, 2010, which 
Shusterman claimed “epitomizes this experiential method of transactional aesthetic 
inquiry.”277 Shusterman had known Toma since 1996, having collaborated with the artist 
on previous occasions, recognizing his key themes of energy and light in his ownership 
and revitalization of Ouest-Lumière, an unused Paris electric company, as a virtual 
company for artistic interventions, in his work as a conceptual artist, and especially 
through the practice of what he terms “Radiant Flux,” a form of “space writing” through 
which the artist works to represent visually and capture the “invisible aura” of the person 
posing for him, which he perceives as a “continuously changing, contextually sensitive 
energetic force emanating from the person’s body.”278 It is this method through which 
Toma worked with Shusterman in 2010, and is achieved through a highly staged, almost 
theatrical indoor or dark photo shoot using long exposure, and Toma’s performance in 
quickly “tracing” the subject’s (here Shusterman, dressed in a gold bodysuit upon Toma’s 
request) aura using the light of a lamp, and remaining in constant, quick motion to keep 
himself out of the finished photo. The resulting images reveal Toma’s visualization of his 
subject’s aura as energetic lines of light; here, in Aesthetic Transaction’s Somaflux 
images, Shusterman is seen as “l’homme en Or” (“The Man in Gold”), grounded and 
serious in Toma’s provided Lycra suit, “that glittering second skin,” activated by upward-
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shooting thin pillars of white light that themselves seem to hold their own presence as 
bodies in the space with Shusterman, as can be seen in the Somaflux photograph used in 
the exhibit poster for Aesthetic Transactions.279 In other Somaflux photographs, these 
pillars of light can be seen seemingly growing from Shusterman’s supine body, enclosing 
him as in a cage, or dancing around his form more tightly and fluidly as he takes a more 
active stance. 
In practicing somaesthetics and using it as a tool for thinking about contemporary 
art, we must, like Dewey and Shusterman, deal in all three dimensions—analytical, 
pragmatic, and practical somaesthetics—and take contemporary art as a proposed bodily 
practice and method of somatic improvement. This requires a significant change in 
mindset at the get-go as we have just defined art in a specific way for this purpose. For 
the purposes of this paper, I will use the analytic and pragmatic dimensions more than the 
practical, as applying practical somaesthetics to contemporary art would largely entail the 
process of creating art itself. 
Looking through analytic somaesthetics, and using it as a tool for thinking about 
contemporary art, we are dealing with the dimension that describes the practices and 
perceptions of the body and their functioning in our knowledge of and construction of 
reality.280 This comes to the forefront in Yann Toma’s Somaflux photographs, as they 
truly embody somaesthetics themselves, seeming to give Shusterman’s philosophy visual 
form and model somaesthetics more explicitly perhaps even than Pollock’s drip paintings 
gave visual form to Dewey’s idea of aesthetic experience or Cézanne’s landscapes gave 
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form to Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology. Here, rather, we can see more directly the 
ideas and parameters of somaesthetics, as Shusterman has laid it out: indeed, as  
 
 
Figure 6: Toma, Yann with Richard Shusterman. Somaflux (2010).  
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Shusterman himself claims, “my work with Yann Toma epitomizes this experiential 
method of transactional aesthetic inquiry.”281 In this sense, these images explicitly deal 
with somaesthetics and we can begin to understand how Shusterman, despite recognizing 
how his somaesthetics through his emphasis on body consciousness and mindfulness may 
seem “New Age,” emphasized somaesthetics’ roots in philosophy’s ancient past and its 
rightful place at the core of aesthetics; it is less radical or new than it is more of a 
restoration and return to values past.  
Toma’s Somaflux series truly embodies somaesthetics, as the “study of experience 
and use of one’s body as a locus of sensory-aesthetic appreciation and creative self-
fashioning,” and as committed to the practices that can improve somatic care, as 
Shusterman himself, subject and participant in the work, can testify.282 In this sense, we 
see somaesthetics involved especially in the process of the creation of the work, through 
the creation of Toma’s Somaflux photographs, as we can understand through the account 
of Shusterman himself as a participant. These photographs work to unravel the mind-
body dualism—Toma and Shusterman work to unravel this themselves through their 
performance and creative process. We can, through Shusterman’s involvement, 
understand the improvement of his own knowledge through the heightened experience of 
his bodily senses and improved directionality of his body in his transformation into 
“l’homme en Or.” 
Through the nature of this image—the way in which it was created—issues of 
bodily perception and use are brought to our attention; without any outside information 
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regarding the photographs, we can see that they contain the existence and movement of at 
least one body, that of Shusterman. He stands, facing the camera, amongst the 
strangeness and darkness of his surroundings punctuated by the other brightly luminous 
forms that share the environment with him. We can note, in the photograph depicting him 
with his arms at his side, the tension in his shoulders, the firmness with which he is 
anchored to the ground, the distance between his feet supporting this solid stance, the 
positioning of his feet, his gaze, his hands at his side. We are aware of these things— the 
tension and motionlessness of Shusterman’s pose, his standing for the long exposure shot, 
the placement and positioning of his body—because it is made explicit to us, mainly 
because of they way in which he is portrayed. Through the form-fitting golden suit, we 
are most made aware of “body”; it is highlighted to us in gold, unhidden by conventional 
clothing or any typical form of appearing, but instead manifests itself to us in a truly 
unexpected way. Here, the form of Shusterman’s body is exposed, and through this 
unusual usurpation of convention and expectation, we are prompted to focus on the body.  
The presence of Toma himself— the second body present in the photograph—is 
made visible only through the traces of the lamps which he held to create the luminous 
forms surrounding Shusterman, to give form to the philosopher’s aura. Here we see 
repeated the idea of form and gesture as trace of the presence and movement of the artist; 
just as Pollock’s drips and splatters served as visual evidence to us of the direction and 
movement of his arm in flinging, spilling, and dripping the liquid paint, and therefore his 
presence, so don’t lines of light serve as evidence of the movement of Toma’s hands and 
arms carrying the lamps: he was here, then he was there, to the left, down, etc…We can 
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follow the line of light as an abstracted trace of his own bodily movement and presence; 
in this sense, the use of the body is brought to our minds as we are prompted by these 
lines to imagine Toma moving around Shusterman. The presence of these two bodies in 
the Somaflux photographs serves as our most immediate point of connection in with the 
idea of the body, especially its use, through these photos.  
What was this process like? What was Shusterman’s experience in having Toma 
move about him, and Toma’s of Shusterman’s necessitated stillness as he himself decided 
and acted on where to trace with light? Shusterman recounts his experience in posing for 
these photographs: 
My instructions as photographic subject were to remain silent and 
motionless in the bare, darkened seminar room, while Yann would swiftly 
hover and dance around me with his two small lamps, trying to sense and 
trace with their light the aura of energy that he felt emanating from my 
body. After a short burst of such energetic swirling, Yann would return 
breathless to his camera to terminate the shot and then rest momentarily 
before beginning a new sortie of aura or energy tracing…Yann whirled 
about me with his lamps and body twirling forcefully so close to me that I 
could feel their motion and his, hear and feel his effortful breathing, and 
occasionally feel his quickly moving body bumping into mine.283  
 
It is not the presence of these two bodies within the frame of the photograph 
which is most interesting to us, but their interaction in the creation of this work (and it 
seems to have truly been an act of work). Through this temporal dance of drawing around 
Shusterman, a transactional dance between experiential and representational modes 
Shusterman identifies as delineating the discipline, the perception and sensory awareness 
of both bodies seem to have been heightened; Toma’s effort to successfully execute the 
precise lines desired without lingering long enough in any one place to allow himself to 
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become a part of the image, and his breathlessness in his forceful, quick whirling about 
also affected Shusterman’s own awareness and perception of the event. We can see this 
through the vividness with which Shusterman recalls what he heard and felt, and it in turn 
prompts us, as viewers, to take on a heightened awareness and perception. The artist and 
philosopher dance between bodies, body and environment, and body as object versus as 
lived experience. Especially as a duet, with Toma dressed in black, the instigator of the 
activity and creation at the beginning, contrasted to and coupled with the gold-clad 
Shusterman, this interaction further highlights to us the nature of the relationship not only 
between subject and artist, but also that of representational and experiential body and 
dualisms in general. As Shusterman reminds us, “it is wrong to think that the 
photographer’s aesthetic experience and the posing subjects can be neatly separated,” just 
as, for him, the mind and body cannot be separated. We can see this through 
Shusterman’s description of his experience.284 Toma and Shusterman together truly 
embody this aspect of somaesthetics. 
Both artist and philosopher are also engaged in each of Shusterman’s three 
dimensions of somaesthetics—the analytic, pragmatic and practical—through their 
collaborative process. Toma engages in this theoretical dimension through his own theory 
with respect to the basic nature of bodily perceptions, practices, and their function in our 
knowledge through his ideas of energy and aura; these are what he seeks to perceive and 
encapsulate of others’ bodies through his work. He also allows for the opening up and 
expanding out to topics outside the body, such as economics, through his conceptual 
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work (including Radiant Flux) as services offered by his company, Ouest-Lumière. These 
ideas of energy and aura are also important to Toma himself as body, with his own aura 
and energy, in working to do this. In his work, dancing around subjects such as 
Shusterman, and clad in black with his lamps, Toma must work toward another key 
aspect of Shusterman’s somaesthetics: inhibition.  
It is through bodily inhibition that Toma is able to create these careful yet 
energetic and powerful images; he is a master of his own body, keeping it invisible while 
highlighting and describing Shusterman’s with light, carefully controlling his own rapid, 
dramatic, and even violent actions for the illumination of the supposed aura of his 
subject. Doing this, in this dance, seems to require rare supercontrol over one’s body, and 
super somaesthetic awareness. Toma himself serves as a model of somaesthetic 
awareness and discipline, it seems, in the creation of this work, integrating of all three 
dimensions of somaesthetics, and serving as a model for Shusterman in his method of 
somatic improvement of choice, art-making via photography and performance. This is the 
“applicable method” Toma proposes and demonstrates through his actions, offering 
Shusterman the chance to further engage in pragmatic somaesthetics by analyzing this 
method.  
The most clearly emphasized dimension of somaesthetics in Toma’s 2010 
Somaflux series is the practical: the actual “body-work” that he does in creating around 
Shusterman, and likewise, Shusterman’s growing engagement in this “body-work” 
himself. This collaboration between artist and subject emphasizes and calls our attention 
to the bodily interaction of artist and subject in all cases, reminding us that at the core of 
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this relation lies a body with respect to another body. If the subject is a landscape, an 
object, an idea, or something more abstract, we are reminded here that at the most basic 
level, as with Cézanne’s landscapes, the creation of a work of art is made up of the bodily 
interaction between artist and subject, his environment and that in it. This interaction is 
dramatized here in that we cannot see Toma’s body, but know that this interaction took 
place via the trace of the lamps he carried. Through this heightened example of the 
relationship between artist and subject, bodily sensory awareness, action and perception, 
Toma and Shusterman instruct us in becoming more aware of our own selves as bodies, 
our own perception and senses. How do we interact with the bodies around us? Our 
environments? Through the intensification of this event, we as viewers are prompted to 
question and consider our own bodies as loci of perception and sensory awareness: how 
do we feel? What do we hear? What is around us? We are prompted to take this example 
of somaesthetics in practice into our own lives, and at least consider our bodies more, 
become more aware of ourselves this way. As Shusterman himself acknowledges, the 
significance of these images lies not in the photographs themselves—the result—but 
rather in the process of their creation.285 Instead, he notes,  
they involve a complex art of collaborative performative process, a 
developing dance of intuitive communication (of energies, feelings, and 
intentions) and cooperative improvisation that ultimately issues in 
photographic prints or video but is itself extremely rich in shared aesthetic 
experience for those involved in that creative performative process.286  
 
 
Through approaching these works through somaesthetics, this process of their 
creation, the interaction between artist and subject, especially as bodies and loci of 
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perception, is emphasized. In this sense, approaching contemporary art through 
somaesthetics can prompt our focus on the creation of the work itself, the conditions and 
context of the artist, and can help us to see these works not as isolated objects removed to 
a museum or gallery, but as created through the integration of the same tools available to 
us all: our perception and our body. In this way, contemporary art, today part of a global 
art world, can become more accessible through focusing on the body and perception.  
This process of heightened somatic awareness and perception during this creation 
of Toma’s Somaflux images held special importance for Shusterman as a philosopher, 
through which we can learn. He claims:  
after a long day and night of docile static posing in the dark, my deep 
somaesthetic drives for sunshine and movement made me suddenly bolt 
from the blackened room into the Abbey’s sunny, flower-fragrant 
courtyard and gardens. Toma chased after me, filming my capering 
ramble…which then prompted me to improvise scenarios of dance and 
gesture that fit my playful mood and picturesque environment…This new 
persona signaled a real change in our transactional aesthetic experience 
that Toma happily welcomed…I had become a real partner in artistic 
creation…that artistic transformation helped transform myself as a 
philosopher, both by providing me new insights into the performative 
process and aesthetic experience of artistic creation…and by extending my 
sense of personal identity as a transactional philosopher of the art of living 
to include this golden, free-spirited, aesthetic avatar who by extending my 
experience into new roles and contexts also expands my self and self-
knowledge.287  
 
 
Shusterman’s experience as the “Man in Gold” highlights and supports the 
existence of the “primordial perception or experience of the world,” the prereflective 
consciousness beneath all language and concepts; through Shusterman’s “escape” into the 
sunshine, he seems to be spontaneously recovering his own childlike prereflective 
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consciousness rather than doing any careful somaesthetic reflection involving 
inhibition.288 On the contrary, he claimed, “it freed me from some inhibitions.”289  
At first impression, this seemingly instinctive and thoughtless act seems to reflect 
Merleau-Ponty’s ideas of the primacy of unreflective consciousness, including the part 
which Shusterman himself rejected: “without the need of distinct perceptual 
representations and without any explicitly conscious deliberation.”290 Shusterman did 
advocate an explicitly conscious deliberation—it was through this distinction which he 
distinguished somaesthetics from Merleau-Ponty’s ideas, establishing it as a discipline in 
which habits that negatively impacted our performance and experience of life could be 
changed through this deliberation and somaesthetic reflection. In this way, we can always 
seek to improve, and, surprisingly, Shusterman supports that this can be done through 
inhibition itself. Whereas in the somaesthetics Shusterman proposes our conditioned 
habits that determine our behavior can be altered if we are able to inhibit our carrying out 
of that habit first, Shusterman, in running out into the sunshine to fulfill his need for 
movement and light, seems to be problematic in his actions.  
However, through this process of the creation of Somaflux, Shusterman emerges 
claiming that “art can provide such reflective transactions by which a philosopher can 
come to see and transform himself through self-exposure.”291 It is through this contrast 
between the appearance of Shusterman’s actions, and his processing of them later in 
reflecting on his performance, that we are able to perhaps understand this transformation 
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in a new light; what may seem like spontaneous, wild, and carefree may have been a 
challenging step towards changing habit for Shusterman. In this case, he may have 
inhibited his learned habit of remaining still in order to learn a new way of being. 
 What can this transformation teach us by looking at art through somaesthetics? 
Through Shusterman’s transformation through performance and taking part in the act of 
creation, we are able to better understand art’s potential aid in this process of practical 
somaesthetics— of working to improve our habits and experience of the world. The 
experience of art seemed to have opened up new possibilities for Shusterman, and to have 
helped him in his quest to improve on habits or learn new ones that would serve to 
improve his experience; for him, this meant learning to take risks in exposing himself, as 
he was dressed as “l’Homme en Or,” to others, to accept help, and to further know 
himself: “how can we have self-knowledge without self-exposure? We need the others’ 
viewpoint on ourselves to see our blind spots and know ourselves more wholly.”292 
(“Aesthetic Transactions”). Through the potential possibilities inherent in art as opposed 
to other areas of life (where “practice” can in turn “enrich and refashion theory”) we 
might be able to more effectively carry out this process of practical somaesthetics and 
improve our own experience and perception. In this sense, contemporary art can emerge 
as powerful through somaesthetics as a means of aiding our own self-improvement. 
Overall, Toma’s and Shusterman’s embodiment and true practice of 
somaesthetics—in its theoretical, pragmatic, and practical dimensions, and both 
representational and experiential modes—serves as a powerful example of a method 
through which to improve our bodily senses and our lived experience. We can analyze 
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this method, propose adjustments or alternatives through our own practicing of pragmatic 
aesthetics as viewers; we can study this method (this type of art-making) and decide for 
ourselves to embark upon the practice of this method and thus practical dimension of 
somaesthetics.  
In this sense, Somaflux is instructional to us as viewers. In approaching these 
works, these images, through somaesthetics, the study of experience and use of one’s 
body (in this case, the bodies of Toma and Shusterman) as a locus of sensory-aesthetic 
appreciation, they become much more to us than photographs: aesthetically pleasing and 
interesting photographs, to be sure, but meaning something different to us alone. Through 
somaesthetics, we can see these images of two bodies, experiencing beings perceiving 
and sensing (although Toma’s is secretly hidden), as examples of a method that we can 
take on ourselves; they serve as instructive. Through this modeling, we are prompted to 
consider our own bodies and how they move, perceive, and interact with their 
environments. Through these mysterious images, we can learn perhaps to consider our 
own bodies in general, to apply this awareness to our own action, and to carry this 
somaesthetic awareness to other areas of our lives, or even throughout our lives.  
Just as Dewey advocated art as the ultimate embodiment of aesthetic experience, 
and thus as a model for interpreting and dealing with experience in general, so too can 
Somaflux be considered a model for how to deal with ourselves as bodies, how to become 
more self-aware. Of course, the extent to which we encounter this work affects our 
understanding of this viewing the still photographs may provide a very different 
experience than watching a video of Shusterman, “l’Homme en Or,” escaping the 
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confines of the darkened interior our into the world, and even more different still from 
encountering “l’Homme en Or” himself, in person during his performances of this role in 
the streets at Aesthetic Transactions. Each of these could serve as instructive on various 
levels in somaesthetics, but all can help us to think about our own senses, perception and 
action, our own relationship to our surroundings. This can be critical in an age where 
“improved direction of one’s body,” and therefore improved our knowledge of the world, 
is not only beneficial but also critical.293  
In approaching contemporary art through Shusterman’s somaesthetics, this 
discipline can be used as a tool for heightening our experience with these objects of life, 
something Shusterman himself recognizes as crucial to our world today where we are 
faced with suffering based on ineffective awareness of the soma.  
Yann Toma’s Somaflux images in Aesthetic Transactions prompt at least 
pragmatic if not practical somaesthetics through prompting our awareness of ourselves as 
bodies (our relationship to ourselves as body-mind, but also to others as other bodies) 
through the visualization of Shusterman’s embodiment of this philosophy through these 
images. They encourage somaesthetic reflection, which we can then apply not only to our 
viewing of these works, but to other areas (hopefully even to all areas) of life, and can 
thus enrich the quality of our experience through improved body consciousness as a 
means to “enhance one’s knowledge, performance and pleasure” and relieve some of the 
suffering Shusterman recognizes we undergo in contemporary culture related to the body 
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(in other words, live more meaningful lives), as Shusterman describes in Body 
Consciousness. 294 
 
Tatiana Trouvé: Polder installations and Untitled “trees” 
Tatiana Trouvé represents another example of contrasting spontaneity and “boldly 
open mind” with “extremely methodological sprit.”295 In looking through somaesthetics 
as a tool with which to think about contemporary art, Tatiana Trouvé provides us with a 
means of applying this to work that does not, as Yann Toma’s work does, explicitly deal 
with the human body. Trouvé’s work, although dealing implicitly with the body instead, 
is no less rich when considered through somaesthetics. Although her work deals less 
directly with the body than Toma’s and others’ included in the show (such as Thelca 
Schiphorst, whose fabricated Tendrils respond to touch); it is just as, if not more, strong 
in its connections to somaesthetics.  
Trouvé, an Italian artist working in Paris, is another contact of Shusterman’s with 
whom he had collaborated prior to the exhibition in 2007, after Trouvé’s winning the 
Marcel Duchamp prize for young artists, conversing with her in French and writing on 
the very topic of her work a text titled “Corps sans Figure.” Shusterman found himself 
“fascinated by the different ways that the soma is extremely central to Trouvé’s art and 
yet representations of it are entirely absent from her work,” and himself feels it to be 
most present in the “transactional experience” of her Polder installations, as well as 
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strongly evoked in two of her Untitled works she refers to as “trees,” both of which are 
featured in the exhibit. 
Through somaesthetics, Trouvé’s Polder installations and “trees” take on new 
meanings and emphases, in turn raising our own body consciousness. Unlike Toma’s 
Somaflux images, there is no direct reference to the body for us to take as a model; 
instead that role is taken on by us, as viewers, explicitly. Rather than the images being 
created as the final result of the process of creation, here, with Trouvé’s Polder and 
Untitled installations, the images seem to serve more as a starting point for a second 
process of creation following the live performance and “transactional experience” key to 
somaesthetics by us, viewers, in our relationship to these objects in space. In our direct 
involvement this way, we are brought to use somaesthetics in a powerful way; it becomes 
not something we understand from a distance or passively by viewing, but rather through  
our own direct experience and engagement. We do not see, removed, body as the locus of 
perception and sensory aesthetic appreciation, its use and perception; we feel and 
perceive this ourselves. Through this, contemporary art, especially the works of Trouvé, 
can become powerful, pertinent and accessible to all of us as bodies, uniting us and 
prompting us to become more aware of our bodies and think more about our own 
experience and its use at this site of sensory-aesthetic appreciation.  
In Trouvé’s Untitled, 2008, we find ourselves in the role previously occupied by 
Shusterman in Toma’s Somaflux images, in inhabiting the shared space between artist 
and subject. Despite the physical absence of the artist, Trouvé herself, we are still 
prompted to feel like the performers in the spaces and objects Trouvé has constructed for 
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us to inhabit, experience, and interact with. This Polder installation consists of lean forms 
and structures formed with thin metal rods bent in wide curves and loops that make the 
metal look like a much more ductile material, almost fluid and moving, as if perhaps this 
is not their permanent state, but rather that they might move again, perhaps while we are 
in the room. Shusterman is right in calling them bodies without a face— there are no 
figural elements to be found in this work, and yet we understand them as having a 
presence just as a body would.  
Untitled 2008 consists of what appears to be a continuous line of metal rod 
punctuated by small, infrequent rubber attachments or handles. Seven or eight times  
the metal rod rises to a curved peak of over seven feet tall, just above the heads of 
viewers, while the bar remaining on the floor appears to pool in abstract designs as if it 
were made not of metal, but of dropped string. This small grouping of metal structures 
stands alone, like a group in conversation.  
How do we, as lived bodies, perceive and experience this piece? As bodies ourselves, our 
awareness may be heightened by these fellow presences, a little taller than us, in the 
room, and we can see how Trouvé’s claim rings true: “‘I believe more and more that the 
fields in which my sculpture and installations come together are opened by links between 
abstraction and architecture, between experiences of space and of the body.’”296 
According to Shusterman, “their reduced architectural spaces…. heighten one’s somatic 
awareness by making one feel one’s body is out of scale.”297 Through this, we are made 
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hyper aware of our own scale, and how we relate to these objects— we feel smaller, and 
may feel enticed to enter into the dialogue that seems to be occurring between the eight 
“bodies.” In this, we become highly active participants in Trouvé’s work, bringing to it a 
life that mirrors that which was lived in its initial creation. In our ability to move around 
this piece, navigate around it in space, study it, and fully engage with it visually and 
physically as an object in the world, we rehearse our own practice of perception and 
exercise our somaesthetic awareness. This is key to the development of ourselves as 
people —we benefit from this practice, as it can be seen as a means of strengthening our 
bodily awareness, which, according to Shusterman, can help us to better experience in 
general, and thus lead us towards living better lives, a goal of his somaesthetics. It can 
work to help us to practice somaesthetic reflection, and become more conscious in our 
working to adjust and change our own habits in order to live better lives.  
 Trouvé’s “trees” also serve as objects for us to interact with as bodies and 
instigators of “aesthetic transactions”; these are metal rods bent sparsely and loosely, 
covered and laced up in leather, tied with hanging strings lose and vein like. These 
strange, reduced yet highly and tactiley, richly detailed forms of metal, wrapped in 
leather and covered in epoxy paint, evoke the body nonetheless— in their posture and 
form, they are suggestive of limbs, while their material (a leather “skin” wrapping a solid 
skeletal structure) is evocative of the stuff of bodies, our own flesh and bones. 
Shusterman notes our human reaction to them as one of sympathy: “their beckoning 
beauty and congenial stature arouse a somatic sympathy that makes one feel one’s body 
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all the more.”298 Whereas in Somaflux, Shusterman’s own body was that put on display 
and exposed, here these forms expose themselves to us and elicit our sympathy; we 
sympathize not by identifying with the subject (before, Shusterman) and his self-
exposure, but as viewers with the forms and feelings evoked by them, in feeling ourselves 
as bodies as sites of perception, as akin to these structures, and thus the ones exposed. On 
the same scale as our bodies, Trouvé’s “trees” such as Untitled, 2008, evoke human 
forms that have suffered in their vulnerable structures— the remains of something that 
was once fuller, perhaps—and thus prompt us to think about the forms of our own bodies 
as healthy and robust in comparison. In feeling sympathy for these forms, we are enacting 
our humanity in relating to these forms that are both exposed and covered, as so aren’t 
we.  
This nature of Trouvé’s “trees”’ construction as simultaneously and interestingly 
both covered and revealed truly embodies the “transactional” nature of somaesthetics: 
through these gaps in the laced leather, these moments between cords and leather 
covering coated in epoxy paint, the outside world can pass. Careful observation of their 
leather lacing reveals their construction to be meticulous and labored, despite the free and 
almost spontaneous form that results as a whole, especially as seen from a distance. 
Through this evidence of the artist’s craft in forming what to us can appear as types of 
bodies, we can be reminded of and see mimicked the careful crafting and construction of 
our own bodies and experience; this echoes Shusterman’s maintenance of the idea that 
even what may seem to us to be spontaneous, free intentionality or action can be thought 
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Figure 7: Trouvé, Tatiana Untitled (2008). Metal, rubber. 7.1 x 8.9 x 7.10 ft 
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of as stemming from habit, but that these habits are not unchangeable— we can change 
their construction. In this sense, Trouvé’s sensitive “tree” installations can reveal to us a 
version of ourselves, and bring our thinking of body and perception as viewers of these 
objects is to the forefront.  
In this sense— a completely different, perhaps more subtle one than Toma’s—
Tatiana Trouvé’s installation pieces in Aesthetic Transactions powerfully evoke the soma 
in a way that prompts somaesthetic reflection and a heightened awareness of ourselves. In 
this, we, all bodies in general, can find one way of finding meaning in her work in our 
basic relation through somaesthetics: her work, through somaesthetics, serves to connect 
us better not only to art, but especially back to ourselves and to other bodies, prompting 
consideration of how we relate to other bodies in general. Trouvé’s installations help 
return the body to our minds as Shusterman hoped to return consideration of the body to 
aesthetics through somaesthetics. 
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Figure 8: Trouvé, Tatiana. Untitled (2008). Metal, leather, epoxy paint. 
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Conclusions 
 
Just as Dewey highlighted the experience of art as the epitome of his idea of 
aesthetic experience, so, perhaps, doesn’t art emerge as a significant encapsulation of 
Shusterman’s somaesthetics. In looking at the work of contemporary artists Yann Toma 
and Tatiana Trouvé, we are not only able to gain a better understanding and have a 
meaningful experience with their work, but are able to better and more fully understand 
somaesthetics, its significance and potential utility in other areas of life or life in general; 
we are able to understand art as an example of a proposed applicable method to improve 
the bodily senses and our lived experience, including that involving art. Just as in viewing 
art, we help to realize a larger, total version of Dewey’s consummatory experience 
surrounding the work, from the artists own doing and undergoing, to the viewer’s 
perception of the artist’s relationship of doing and undergoing, forming one all-
encompassing doing (by the artist) and undergoing (by the viewer), so don’t we, through 
viewing art, fully practice Shusterman’s somaesthetics. This occurs especially through 
the experiential mode of somaesthetics, “the experience of one’s own body from 
within.”299 
In today’s highly decentralized and global contemporary art world, somaesthetics 
provides a means of approaching and thinking about contemporary art that anyone, any 
“body-mind,” might employ— regardless of nationality, language, class, gender, 
sexuality, age, political or religious views, etc…—and therefore a truly democratic means 
which can then work to break down barriers between high and low art, art and life. Of 
course, somaesthetics cannot be prescribed as all-encompassing, the only, or even the 
                                                
299 Shusterman, “Somaesthetics: A Disciplinary Proposal,” 299. 
 106 
best or most effective means of understanding contemporary art; many at least general, if 
not specific, political, social, autobiographical, or many other types of meanings 
contained in a work could be lost through adherence to a pure, singular and dogmatic 
reliance on somaesthetics or any discipline alone as a tool for approaching art. 
Somaesthetics, then, is just one way in which to approach and think about contemporary 
art, one that can be meaningful and useful in approaching that in today’s decentralized 
and global contemporary art world. It is perhaps through somaesthetics which we can 
truly understand a systematic method of truly “experiencing” art—any art—as Susan 
Sontag calls us to do.  
Although it may be in specific meanings understood through specific knowledge 
of context, history, political, economic or social systems, psychology, philosophy or 
biography of the artist of any given work of art or of the art object itself where an art 
object may take on more meaning and become most exciting, significant or important to 
someone or many, somaesthetics can offer one method through which anyone, any 
“body,” and the public at large, could approach and find meaning in contemporary art, a 
method through which divisions of high and low art, and of art and life can be worked to 
be disassembled, and through which aesthetics might be, as Shusterman hopes, restored 
to its former definition as a “life-improving cognitive discipline that extends far beyond 
questions of beauty and fine arts and involves theory and practical exercises” in which 
the body is no longer neglected.300 
How effective is a call for this in an art history thesis which deals with aesthetics 
itself, and which will inevitably not be read by “anyone” or “the public at large” but 
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likely a smaller, specific audience, my professors and perhaps others already interested in 
somaesthetics, aesthetics, phenomenology or contemporary art? Will any friends and 
family who may read this who perhaps do not regularly seek out interacting with 
contemporary art or art in general be the ones who might stand to gain the most, and, if 
so, how might an argument for a means of approaching contemporary art be most 
effective? 
Shusterman has already answered just this through his actions in curating 
Aesthetic Transactions in 2012. Perhaps it is through these public events—exhibitions 
themselves—through which these methods of approaching contemporary art can be 
communicated, divisions between high and low art, art and life, may be worked on being 
disassembled, and aesthetics worked on being restored as a further-reaching, more 
practical in addition to theoretical, “life-improving” discipline that is not considered 
limited to questions of beauty or fine arts, a discipline which one might be more likely to 
interact with and benefit from sooner than years into the study of art history or 
philosophy. Through his writings and lectures, many of which can be found and watched 
on YouTube, and especially through curating an exhibition connecting somaesthetics to 
contemporary visual art, Richard Shusterman has publicly emerged as a type of celebrity-
philosopher, but one who seems to have genuinely worked towards this restoration of 
aesthetics to its proposed origins as a discipline that can be useful and applicable in 
improving our lives. Perhaps what could be called for next is a public exhibition of 
contemporary art like Aesthetic Transactions in the U.S.  
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